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ABSTRACT
This paper examines the effect of economic integration (EI)1 and political unity on
linguistic diversity and the new function and status of the English language in Europe.
Using a broad range of analytic approaches for examining the evolving linguistic
situation and for assessing how strong the demand for a common language in Europe is,
this paper shows that the current sociolinguistic transformation and the growing use of
English as the language of choice are both strong effects and key indicators of the
dynamic integration process. As I shall show in the following sections, linguistic analyses
based on continent-wide patterns of second language acquisition and language use in
different formal and informal contexts across Europe from 1950s to the present indicate
the evolution of a dynamic, complex, and interesting linguistic pecking order in which
English is increasingly assuming the role of the ‘integrating’ and functional language.
Keywords: European Economic and Political Integration, Linguistic Diversity, English.

Economic Integration (EI) here refers to the continuous removal of tariff and nontariff restrictions among
nations through economic policies and political agreements meant to bring about economies of scale,
increased productivity, and lower prices; whereas European Integration is the whole process of not just
economic integration but also the political, legal, cultural, social and sociolinguistic integrations of the
participating countries either wholly (e.g. for Germany) or partially (e.g. as was for UK) in Europe.
1
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Preface and Acknowledgements
My interest on the topic of languages evolved naturally during many spirited classroom
discussions with Professors both in the Department of Anthropology as well as in the
Political Science Department here at Hunter and at Baruch College all of which helped
nurtured my academic interest leading me to be convinced that learning and education is
indeed a highly selective process and contestable enterprise. As I came to see it, the
process involves deliberate choices on what material gets to be included, discussed,
emphasized, and what gets ignored, played down or marked for exclusion – all for good
reasons. During those class discussions and before narrowing down to this present topic
on European integration and its sociolinguistic situation, I was interested in investigating
one of three broad topic areas:
●

Egypt or Mesopotamia: which was the first to rise and why?

●

The Rise of the State and the Evolution of Monotheism (using Egypt as the case
study), and

●

History and the Behavior of Power (showing how in history, culturally similar or
different, leading nations applied their power).

My hypotheses were: One/ it was Egypt which rose first before Mesopotamia (which I
found out ran contrary to that of the views held by Professors like Greg. Johnson who
was also Chair of the Department of Anthropology), Two/ the evolution of Monotheism
mirrored the development of the State - at least for Egypt, and Three/ that the behavior of
politico-cultural power could be usefully compared to that of gravity, to be studied as
such, and could be even regarded as independent of its possessors much as one would
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talk of a person or nation as being possessed by power (the familiar phrases that ‘what
goes up comes down’ or ‘history repeats itself’ are pertinent metaphors).
It was incredibly satisfying thinking of the academic potentials and merits of these
topics; and I still believe they are great topics awaiting serious attention. However, for
their further consideration, I was unable to enlist the kind of interest and or support I felt I
needed either because I had failed to cultivate the student-faculty socializations at the
time necessary for their enthusiastic participation or because the topics were just
considered, again, too sensitive to delve into as my discussions with Professors like J.
Brown on race matters, and Greg. Johnson on Mid-Eastern origins led me to believe.
My fourth topic option was on the evolution of the European languages after having a
lively discussion once with my former linguistics Prof. E. Bendix (now emeritus) on the
subject of the origin of languages. Here too, judging from the discussions, I concluded
that this research topic was also equally problematic as it was about the tracing of
Indo-European languages that inevitably leads one on a sure path to their African roots
according to a Graduate Seminar I took with Prof. Delgado on Paleoanthropology which
asserts that Africa is humanity’s cradle (I remember writing: “The Problem of Modern
Human Origins and Why it Matters” as one of my term papers discussing human origins).
Finally, upon a reconsideration of that general topic on languages from a different
angle, this present thesis and its multidisciplinary approach took shape - inspired by
insights drawn from principles such as the 'uniformitarian principle' in geology that the
natural forces or processes observable today are similar to those which shaped the past. In
other words, studying this topic in a contemporary setting - the process and dynamics of
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modern European integration - provided me a new testing ground to apply the same
general principles, theories or insights I would have had to apply had I taken on the other
more historically situated topics. It also allowed me to use a methodological approach
that is both diachronic and synchronic as it is theoretical and empirical.
The thesis essentially sets out to investigate ‘culture changes’ in a macro and
transformational context by shedding light on the interactive causal dynamics between
the economic and political forces and the emerging sociolinguistic situation with the aim
of applying that understanding to show further the type of interventionist policies that can
be feasible, practical, or desirable in a multilingual European Union.
I am therefore truly indebted to all those privileged and stimulating discussions of the
Undergraduate or Graduate Seminars I participated. I am thankful to all the Professors of
the departments of Anthropology and Political Science (and Sociology) who, in one way
or another, have contributed in my academic life. I am also grateful to all the Professors
and Graduate Advisors for their understanding and patience. I am particularly thankful to
Prof. McGovern and Prof. Zarcadoolars of the Department of Anthropology for support
and feedback on earlier drafts of this thesis. All opinions, facts, or errors expressed in this
paper, written in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts
(Anthropology), Hunter College, The City University of New York, are mine alone.
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SUMMARY
The impact of economic and political integration on linguistic diversity has stimulated an
upsurge of recent research interest on the link between the two phenomena. This paper
examines the cumulative effect of integration on linguistic diversity and the new
functions and status of the English language within the European Union (EU), one of the
most significant multi-issue developments still unfolding in Europe.
The paper employs a wide range of analytic approaches showing the links between the
economic, political, and sociolinguistic spheres and uses survey data analyses to assess
the evolving linguistic situation in Europe and to what extent English is becoming the
primary language of transnational communication for many EU citizens.
By and large, the sociolinguistic evidence presented in this paper indicate that the
harmonizing and homogenizing dynamics of the economic, political and social
integration have a significant impact on sociolinguistic diversity as languages compete
and complement one another and as English becomes the most commonly spoken foreign
language at the expense of others. In the future, English will be the most used language
for intra-EU-wide communications in which it performs the different roles and functions
of a mother tongue for some, a regional language for many, and a lingua franca for most.
Consequently, when modeling the Continent’s evolving sociolinguistic trajectory, the
most predictable in time will be the evolution of a linguistic pecking order, an increasing
language convergence whereby languages become more similar to each other, and the
emergence of a new continent-wide English variety with the distinctive characteristics of
the broader macro-cultural context and overall sociolinguistic situation of Europe.
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Introduction
Introduction to the content, scope and significance, and approaches and
methodology.
Recently, there has been a resurgence of interest to understand better the forces that
activate and shape economic integration, transform political structures and build new
institutions with the aim of gaining insights and developing a useful explanation of the
process. There is a considerable amount of attention being devoted particularly to the
understanding of the profound development taking place in Europe in which established
patterns of economic, political, and social structures are being constantly altered and
reordered. Various analytic frameworks from different disciplinary perspectives have
been developed over the past decades by economists, political scientists, sociologists,
anthropologists3, and others interested in European integration to assess the dynamics of
this process: its course, the consequences it generates, and how to respond to some of its
adverse effects. Diverse studies commissioned by the European Commission,
contributions cataloged in the ARENA working papers4, as well as ones by individual
scholars, among others, represent this growing interest on the subject. This paper is
therefore an attempt to study “culture” changes in its macro form which is, in the words
of the anthropologist Edward Tylor (1832-1917), “..that complex whole which includes
knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, custom, and any other capabilities and habits acquired by
man as a member of society” 5 including language.

3

See Irene Bellier and Thomas M. Wilson (ed), (2000) on: The Anthropology of the European
Union; and Kockel, Ullrich (ed) (2015) on: Companion to the Anthropology of Europe
4
http://www.sv.uio.no/arena/english/research/publications/arena-working-papers/
5
https://www.britannica.com/biography/Edward-Burnett-Tylor
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This paper reviews some of the theoretical conceptions and empirical findings often
employed in the literature to examine aspects of the causal characteristics and functional
mechanisms of the economic and political integration process (the independent
variable) and its overall impact on the sociolinguistic situation (the dependent variable)
in Europe. This is because, at a fundamental level, economic and political integration
necessarily lead to cultural unity of sorts that generates an inviting environment for
linguistic unity. This macro-causal, deterministic approach, follows the tradition of
thought which asserts that there are crucial, difficult to measure factors that help regulate
or guide man’s behavior in spite of his participation seemingly as a ‘free-agent.’
Darwin’s theory that biological factors do act as the basis for what man can be or do and
what he cannot, Freud’s insight that subconscious activities of the human mind are
responsible for much of man’s basic choices, decisions, and actions, Marx's
understanding that economic forces are what serve as the superstructures affecting man’s
political calculations, behavior and conditions, as well as Sapir-Whorf’s argument that
meanings imposed by language significantly influence man’s thought, perceptions, and
actions are some of the factors.
In this paper, however, I shall examine European integration from the 1950s to the
present to illustrate the interactive nature of the economic, political, and sociolinguistic
spheres. This deserves examination because, the development not only better tests aspects
of some prevailing theories in the social sciences, it also has the significance of being the
first important test on new structures and institutions such as the EU set to transform
and/or depart from the traditional nation-state system – thereby setting a precedent for
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other regional or global integrations that is different from the very self-limiting
characteristics of the nation-state. But I want to consider this question in a much broader
and richer context by drawing on the anthropological, economic, as well as the political
science approaches and insights on integration in order to avoid viewing it in too narrow
and shallow a focus. From a theoretical standpoint, what is happening in Europe - the
internal reorganization of society in which economic and political differences between
nation-states are minimized through deeper and wider harmonization and collective
external adaptation - is not surprising since it is broadly in accord with prevailing
evolutionary theories on the nature of sociocultural systems according to which
macro-scale structures are the emergent properties of micro-scale processes (White,
1949, 1959, 1975; Johnson, 1982). Thus, the paper begins with a brief examination of the
characteristics and behavior of sociocultural systems in general in order to more
meaningfully situate European integration as an evolving functional system in which the
interactive nature of its people, member states, and the emergent EU institutions are
analogous to those of the parts, structures, and the whole of a fully functioning
organizational system. As Lewis and Steinmo have noted (2007), “evolutionary theories
begin with an understanding of change as being a simultaneously endogenous and
exogenous process. Instead of seeing the process as one of fundamental stability (what
political scientists and economists would call ‘equilibrium’) evolutionary theorists
understand the world as a ‘complex adaptive system.’” (the authors’ emphasis).
I have organized the paper into an introduction, two main parts: Part One and Part
Two, and the conclusion. Part One constitutes the foundation and addresses two
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fundamental issues: theoretical orientation, framework, or methodology with a review of
the literature on the general characteristics and behavior of sociocultural systems in
section I and an overview of the evolution and structure of European integration in
Section II. While Part Two constituting the socio-economic dimensions of language
addresses two other main issues: evolution of linguistic diversity in Europe in Section III
and the emerging status of English as the integrative and functional language for Europe
in Section IV. And the conclusion, taking into consideration major current events such as
the eurozone crisis, the refugee crisis, and Brexit, in Section V.
The analyses begin in Section II on the key links between the economic and the
political spheres. It brings theory closer to data and further strengthens the reliability of
the findings and conclusions in the sections that follow. The cumulative effect of the
economic and political integration on the linguistic diversity using sociolinguistic data
analyses derived mainly from the European Commission’s language survey services, the
‘Eurobarometer,’ the ‘Eurostat’6 and others is presented in section III. Following Crystal
(2003), Graddol (1997), and to some extent Phillipson (2003) and others, section IV
examines the effect of the integration process on the functions and status of the English
language. We apply the derived implications from Kachru’s concentric model on the
functional uses of English to assess to what extent English is becoming the most widely
used European language in Europe. Section 5 concludes the paper.

6

They are periodic public opinion surveys and data analyses in the countries of the EU, established by the
European Commission, aimed at monitoring the development of public opinion among the EU population.
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PART ONE: Section I
European integration and the nature of behavior of sociocultural systems: a
functionalist approach
1.1 Evolution and culture change
Some observers insist that European integration, when placed in its overall context,
represents “one of the very few current situations in which the decomposition of old
nations can be systematically analyzed within the framework of the evolution of a larger
polity - a polity destined, perhaps, to develop into a nation of its own” (Haas, 2004:xxxi
(1958)). That is, the evolution into a larger continent-wide political-economic and
sociolinguistic single system with its own characteristics. However, in order to analyze
the process showing how changes in one area are related to changes in other fields, we
must start with systems in general which are similarly composed of interrelated,
interacting, and interdependent kinds of parts or structures with complementary
functions. In principle, systems are self-regulating entities possessing the following
characteristics: among other things, (I) inner cohesion (II) greater coordination, and (III)
functional harmony, between parts to ensure efficient functioning and dynamic stability
of the overall system. A system has its parts, structures, institutions or spheres
interrelated into patterned arrangements which determine, to a varying degree, the
relative functions of individuals as well as that of the system itself. Moreover, complex
systems have embedded subsystems in which the causal links between parts and whole or
center and periphery are not only complex and indirect which render the interactive
processes of mutual influence and feedback uneven, but the links may also be difficult to
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identify, analyze or interpret. Generally, according to White (1959), systems can evolve
only in their systemic forms adapting continually to their environment within
self-sustained dynamic equilibria in which changes in one or more parts or levels impact
the rest of the system. Furthermore, such systems also can evolve through the
differentiation of functions and structures and can expand or collapse through dynamic
processes which accelerate or inhibit system growth as reported by Johnson (1982).
These essential and shared characteristics of systems taken together, interestingly, are
also being exhibited by the evolving European Union system.
For instance, “If a system, biological or cultural, possesses energy resources
beyond the necessity of merely maintaining the status quo, it will evolve, i.e., take steps
to produce a more highly organized, more powerful system,” as White (1975:31) pointed
out. That is, it shall evolve by means of “vertical cleavages” and “horizontal cleavages,”
at least for sociocultural systems, corresponding to their depth and breadth according to
Steward (1972:66). In other words, successful systems such as ‘free market democracies,’
like biological species, expand while unsuccessful ones like Communism contract or die
out following the principle that the most efficient or best adaptable have the best chance
for further development or survival. It is also observed that sociocultural evolution, the
term for how societies and cultures change over time consisting of selection from
interacting ‘traditions,’ institutions, or systems in a given context, is a dynamic process
akin to “natural selection” – the key mechanism in biological evolution. In other words,
whereas biological evolution takes place through the ‘gene’7 selection, cultural evolution

7

The unit of heredity that determines the basic characteristics of offsprings and is transferred from
parent to offspring.

12

takes place with the help of the ‘meme’ - the mechanism by which behavior, style or idea
is spread in culture from person to person.
The process seemingly operates ‘blindly’ according to random selection and hence
ensures that evolutionary processes generally remain ‘neutral’ of rational design or
purposeful action - implying that evolutionary change may not be a ‘goal’ or ‘progress’
driven process after all - at least in the Darwinian sense. Stated differently in the words of
Deutsch (1988):
Not all of the behavior of political leaders, interest groups, governments, and
states is purposive. At all levels - among individuals, groups, and nations - the
communication channels and messages directing them toward their goals are not
the only ones that impinge on their behavior. Indeed, several goals and several
streams of messages from both without and within, may be competing for the
limited available communication channels and for the time and attention of
decision makers. Some of these competing inputs may be relatively random; and
all of them may increase the confusion within the decision-making system and the
overload on its channels facilities, and personnel. This can result in making some
part of its output relatively random, and hence cause the whole input-output cycle
to be much less predictable in the distribution of its results. (p. 92)
Furthermore, since evolutionary change is, moreover, a complex process and proceeds
imperceptibly slowly, a useful distinction is often made between ‘micro-level evolution’
which refers to the development of variation within the same kind and ‘macro-level
evolution’ that refers to the development of one type of a different kind. Anthropologists
generally consider such distinct forms of human society: bands, clans, chiefdoms,
kingdoms, nations, and nation-states as instances of macro-level evolution which they
point out developed both of size and complexity by means of “integration” - the
progressive linking of existing structures and institutions into larger, interrelated and
coherent organizations. The evolutionary process, in some cases, however, may be
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regression or disintegration (“fission”)8 to an earlier type, a negative form of integration
(entropy). Contemporary analysts of political integration usually cite the dissolution of
the Soviet Union as an instance of macro-level disintegration in which its nations, the
subsystems, and the center could not evolve further or hold together in the face of
pressing internal and external challenges that faced the system. Such dynamics of
integration-disintegration, and hence a system’s evolutionary path, are aptly summarized
by Olsen (2005):
Most of the time, integration into a larger organized system competes with the
desire for autonomy among the system's components. It is difficult to find and
maintain a proper balance between system integration and sub-unit autonomy.
System coordination and coherence tends to foster efforts to protect the identity
and distinctive character of the components. Likewise, differentiation of
subsystems and integration of each component, are likely to generate demands for
system coordination and control, coherence and consistency. Processes of
political integration, therefore, can trigger disintegration and processes of
disintegration can trigger reintegration and coordination. Hence, all systems are
facing the questions of how much and what forms of unity the components can
tolerate and how much and what forms of diversity the systems can tolerate. (p. 4)
Thus, in the evolution of the EU, for the most part, this tendency explains why the
nation-states of Europe while moving in the collective direction of integration in some
respects are for preserving some aspects of their national autonomy at the same time. Yet,
according to Johnson (1982: 396), “System disruption or simultaneous hierarchy
development

may

not

be

the

only

alternatives

available

to

deal

with

scalar-communications stress. If a problem is being generated by the presence of too
many units in the system, it might be possible to make the operational size of these
units… larger, and thus the number of units in the system smaller.” And some observers

8

Napoleon Chagnon, in his study of the Yanomamo ‘tribes’ of South America mapped out such
fissioning of villages.
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of EI have viewed the nation-states in Europe as constituting too many units in need of
further development, thus why “The Europe that gave birth to the idea of the nation-state
appears to be well on the way to rejecting it in practice” in order to evolve (Lindberg,
1963:3).
1.2 European integration and the evolutionary-functionalist approach
The ‘emergence,’ or more correctly the evolution, of European integration has brought
together sovereign nation-states into ‘ever closer union’ through a dynamic process of
economic, political and social integration considered one of the most extraordinary
phenomena in contemporary international politics or organizational studies, not the least
because seemingly it is proceeding against the explanatory and predictive powers of the
finest theories in social science literature. In some respects, the EU seems more like a
traditional international organization; in other ways, it is closer to a Continent-wide
confederal arrangement; and yet in many more aspects, it resembles and increasingly
functions as a typical nation-state with other characteristics of an evolving supra-state
that is poised to relieve its members of higher tasks. Accordingly, there are different
ontological and epistemological approaches or orientations reflecting this - and various
conceptual frameworks consistent with the underlying perception of the EU as unique,
n-1 or a sui generis9, have appeared with little agreement about its exact nature or its
future end stage (Rosamond, 2000).
1.2.1 The statist, or ‘realist,’ approach vs. the evolutionary, or ‘neo-functionalist,’
approach
n-1 or sui generis is sometimes used to describe the EU as a new and different type of
organization that has no true precedents - for which some things are simply unique to itself and past
experiences may not fully apply to it.
9
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Consequently, theorists and empirical researchers often differ in their view of
European integration: whether it should be treated as a process, a condition, or an
outcome - leading to different theories, model analyses, and levels of analyses, etc. in the
attempt to explain EI satisfactorily. In particular, two basic approaches have been
employed by political scientists and economists in their analyses: (a) the statist, or
‘realist,’ approach which emphasizes the centrality of states (the parts), why they
cooperate, and how this shapes the integration process and (b) the evolutionary, or
‘neo-functionalist,’ approach which privileges the role played by the EU’s own emergent,
centralized institutions (the whole) and its increasing impact on the behavior of its
Member States in which “The states themselves are changed as a result of their
participation in European integration” (Sandholtz, 1996: 426). The latter regards
integration as a top-down process while the former a bottom-up process - an important
distinction

when analyzing causality.

The

weakness of the

statist,

strictly

intergovernmental approach, however, stems in part from the growing preeminence of the
EU over its Member States on a range of vital issues.
These broad scholarly strategies seek to examine the causal characteristics and
mechanisms of the process of change in terms of two sets of factors frequently discussed
in the relevant literature: namely, the “endogenous” factors that are determined by the
integration system and the “exogenous” factors that are causally independent from the
system’s internal variables such as the roles of NATO and globalization and their effects
on European integration. Analysts who seek to explain EI within the ‘statist’ context are
more likely to focus on the role played by the interacting endogenous factors and their
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interconnectedness while those who seek to view the process from an evolutionary,
global, context are more apt to recognize the role of external factors such as the
transformative effects of modern transport-communications technologies as triggers and
their subsequent impact on European integration. This suggests that the two approaches
are not mutually exclusive but complementary and that EI could be better explained in
terms of both sets of factors which are invariably interrelated whether they function as the
antecedent, conditioning, intervening, dependent or independent variables and whether it
is at the micro- or macro-levels. However, ‘exogenous shocks’ or factors such as
Europe’s deep desire for independence from US influence, its fear of a potential future
subordination to a more powerful China, and other advantages to be gained through
collective action, all seem to explain better the macro-level strategies of European
integration.
1.2.2 ‘Unilinear evolution’ vs. ‘multilinear evolution’
Anthropologists, not surprisingly, also have two broad, similar approaches on how
sociocultural systems, to which we include the EU, evolve, function, and are maintained:
“unilinear evolution” and “multilinear evolution”. These approaches mainly deal with
variability, change and continuity corresponding to the neofunctionalist and statist
(intergovernmental) approaches respectively. The unilinear model pioneered by previous
anthropologists such as Lewis H. Morgan (1818-1881) and Edward Tylor (1832-1917)
posits that a sociocultural system evolves, in the sense that is presently applied to
European integration, following the path of increase of size, greater complexity and the
development of organizational hierarchy. It stresses the overall linear direction of human
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history and emphasizes the essential and decisive role of technology in the development
process - for “It is the technological sector of a cultural system that harnesses and puts to
use the energy necessary to the cultural system” (White, 1975:18). However, in the early
20th century, a systematic critique and consequently a rejection of the uni-linearly
deterministic approach was accompanied by the acceptance of the rather multi-linearly
static evolutionary approach whose emphasis is based on cultural relativism. Cultural
anthropologists, led by Franz Boas, operating under the principle of ‘data first, theories
later’ criticized the unilinear evolutionary theorists for their simple-to-complex notion of
evolution, for their failure to account satisfactorily the significant role of
non-technological

culture variables, and for

their deep interest ‘in making

generalizations’ at the expense of relevant specificities (Steward, 1955). Moreover, they
objected to the claims that cultural changes are both progressive and directional, or that
societies can be ranked on a single, linear scale of evolutionary complexity or worth; i.e.,
such as ‘primitive’ or ‘underdeveloped’ social forms vs. ‘civilized’ or ‘advanced’
societies. From the perspective of the multilinear model or cultural particularism, cultures
are to be compared only relatively in accordance with their respective historical
specificities. Consequently, according to this model, there is much more to cultural
evolution and cultural variability than simply the one assigned to the role of technology
in determining change. They argue, for example, different outcomes and variability could
also be generated from identical background conditions simply when ideological10
motives intervene. The 19th-century Manifest Destiny - a belief or doctrine that US

10

Ideological motives derived from a collection of beliefs that are held by society or by an individual.
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expansion throughout the Americas was inevitable and justified is an apt example. Thus,
with a focus on cultural particularities between cultures and the role of the more fluid
factor of human agency, this synchronically sensitive model sought to replace the
deterministic trending of unilinear evolution in which the role of human agency in
directing development takes the place of technological determinism.
1.3 The resurgence of the technology-led model of change: economic determinism in
social evolution
By the 1940s, however, a second generation of anthropologists lead by Leslie White
(1949, 1959, and 1975) sought to revive the earlier unilinear and diachronic model by
increasingly relying also on empirical evidence with emphasis on the interrelationships
between the state of technological systems and the other subsystems of culture. From the
perspective of this model, a sociocultural system can, in fact, be distinguished from
others by its unique technological base reflected in the patterns of its economic
subsistence, political organization, and social institutions. According to this refined
model, the economic sphere within which the technologic component is integral
subordinates all other subsystems within the system in terms of dynamic causal relations
and that development in technology inevitably lead to further evolution of sociopolitical
organization of a culture. That is, changes brought about by the operation of new
technologies must be accompanied by changes in the other aspects of society since an
organic whole must develop at relative structural-functional equilibrium. Moreover, the
model disputed the assertion that cultural variations merely reflect differences in
environmental, human, or ideological factors, arguing that there is a strong deterministic
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relationship between all the components or spheres of a sociocultural system.
As White (1975) argues, different cultures are characterized not only by different
levels and forms of development and sophistication, they can be explained better by
reference to the determining technological variables rather than specifics of the
conditioning geographical environments or human factors. White’s (1949) analysis of the
evolution of culture, “from Anthropoid society to Human society” with emphasis on the
role of the economic sphere, strongly emphasized that the technological contribution to
the development process of sociocultural systems has been quite significant and this, he
argues, undermines the claims of historical particularism. For him, the discovery and/or
invention of distinct technologies were noticeably accompanied not only by greater
harnessing of energy but also by higher forms of social organization and complexity:
from the band level of hunters and gatherers, the nation-state system of modern society,
to the emergence of further unions of the nation-states. This conclusion, prima facie,
admittedly maintains a linear sequence of evolution along which all cultural systems,
though obviously at uneven rates and different periods, presumably progressed - just as
rejected by the multilinear model.
In White’s view, a sociocultural system evolves in the direction of greater
complexity in proportion to the level of technology at hand, according to rules inherent to
culture itself. His evolutionary theory of culture focuses on the relationships between
technology (the primary means), the harnessing of energy, ‘the active agent,’ and the
overall development of culture (White, 1975:376). In empirical terms, he states that the
degree of cultural development, and thus differences between cultures, can be explained
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using a E x T x V = P formula, in which E, T, and P have (positive) values where E is the
energy factor or variable, T the technology/tool factor, V for the environment, and P the
total product or degree of cultural development. With that, White (1959: 49) formalized a
culture growth model to estimate the relative contribution of each variable that enables
comparison between different cultures. Thus, cultures will vary as the determining
variable, T, varies and it is this which he claimed directly determines cultural variability
both diachronically and synchronically rather than the environmental V factor which he
regards to be a constant variable.
His model, thus views the role of technology, whether in Ancient Egypt or the
European Union, as the prime mover in the change process; it views a wide range of
phenomena such as sociopolitical setups and the functions of languages in society as
being shaped by the operating imperatives of changes brought by technology and places
purposeful human action and the intervening social arrangements as secondary. It is in
short a 'technology-led' model which regards decisive changes in new technologies as the
essential instruments of change at every level of society. And, it is from this perspective
that the role of advanced modern technologies such as air, sea, and land transport and
communication systems like telephone, radio, TV, internet, etc. get causal priority in the
transformation of Europe. For it is these technologies which have made European
integration entirely feasible through the fundamental changes brought on the functioning
of nation-states and the interactions of their languages.
But more significantly, White (1975) also asserts that technologies and some of
their applications may develop independently from purposeful concerns, setting out on
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lives of their own acting to regulate sociopolitical activity and its meaning. This view is
consistent with the core hypotheses of evolutionary theory and the law of unintended
consequences. It not only suggests that sociopolitical behavior has strong technologically
determined sociopolitical correlates, but it also poses new questions about the extent to
which ‘purposeful actors’ play a role in determining the forces of change. As he argues,
“It is not a changing sentiment that turns the wheels of social evolution. Rather, it is the
alteration of social and political groupings by the operation of technological forces that
determines the direction and scope of the sentiment” (White, 1959: 26). In other words, it
is the advancement of the technological “forces that made small political units obsolete
and their amalgamation inevitable;” not the mere visions of statesmen (White, 1959: 26).
However, others have suggested that the technology component and the economic sector
are relevant though they may not perform the determining role in development processes
quite independent of the other factors.
1.4 An alternative model of change: ‘organizational structure and scalar stress.’
An alternative approach to sociopolitical and organizational change has argued
that in complex organizations or sociocultural systems, other factors such as different
modes of organizing a system, policies, human values which may be less dependent on
the role of technology may influence, if not determine, the direction, processes, and
structures within which change takes place. In particular, Johnson’s (1982) ‘organization
structure and scalar stress’ model, which considered both ‘small-group’ as well as
‘large-scale’ dynamics, focuses on demographic growth, organizational and structural
changes, etc. as underlying factors which affect sociopolitical evolution and under what
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conditions, system’s growth or evolution might falter. It regards the development of
communication technologies such as writing as responsive mechanisms designed to meet
the needs of administrative and control functions. It is a ‘technology demand-pull' model
in sharp contrast to the ‘technology-led’ model: in the former, technology facilitates
cultural progress, in the latter it determines progress. In this ‘technology demand-pull'
sense, technologies act like biological mutants: they ‘emerged’ (are invented) only to
meet the demand of a selective pressure or ‘scalar stress’ rather than being created to
bring about desired changes.
Johnson (1988) applied the concept of “scalar stress” largely as an
empirical-analytic technique to show the interrelations between population size,
organizational complexity, political structure, scalar stress, the development of new
technology, and the evolution of social systems. He defined organizational performance
which is at the root of change in his model as load/capacity; and like White (1959), he
formalized ‘scalar stress’ as (n-squared - n)/2 where n = the number of units in the
organization system (such as the number of nation-states within the EU (28)). As he
shows, technological innovations, though can help the development process in reducing
scalar-related stresses on existing structures and processes - by increasing the number of
information channels between center and periphery, or making the operational size of
units larger by means of integration and, thus, the number of units in the system smaller,
could increase performance in an evolutionary way (Johnson, 1982:396). That is, an
organization or system could evolve ‘sequential hierarchies’ in which case it has simply
‘reorganized’ itself without significant changes in technology. For example, instead of
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organizing a, b, c, d together in one group in abcd, they could be reorganized into various
forms such as: ac, ad, dc, cb, etc. which would essentially not only change form but also
meaning and performance, among other things. The ‘multi-speed’ form of differentiated
integration adopted by the EU on the basis of similar organizational models allows
common objectives to be pursued first by a group of member states both willing and able
to proceed in a chosen area such as in the single currency, and Schengen area with the
implication others will follow later when ready and able.
His analysis based on very diverse datasets obtained from different social science
literature on various group dynamics shows that simply by restructuring the size of
operational units within an organization, the ability to process and monitor information in
decision-making contexts would be increased. This means by simply restructuring its
organization with just the right ideas it would be possible to bring significant, to be sure
endogenous, changes within a system. Thus, as Steward (1972: 21) puts it, “There are
certain problems in which man’s rational and emotional potentials are not a zero factor in
the equation.” And

as some anthropologists, Shore and Wright (1997 have further

observed, governing policies can be viewed as "political technologies" that are useful
instruments for ordering society or organizations.

1.5 Multi-causation and economic primacy
Admittedly, these arguments suggest a lack of general consensus on the relative
weight of causal factors on the evolution of sociocultural systems leading some analysts
to argue for a “multicausal view” of reciprocal causation between variables, suggesting
that the issue of causality in developed systems is just too complex to be captured by a
single theoretical model or to be determined by one main factor. In fact, the issue on the
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relative roles of technology vs. organizational style and ideas, the economic vs. the
political, and nature vs. nurture, in determining change of any system has been a subject
of ongoing scholarly debate with no single acceptable answer at present and remains one
of the most difficult to resolve within social science.
These arguments and the lack of a clear-cut consensus regarding causation
notwithstanding, the models and overall approach in this paper on social evolution with
particular pertinence to European integration follow the “economic relevance” view of
Moravcsik (1998) according to which:
Economic interests remained primary. Pressures from economic interest groups
generally imposed tighter constraints on policy than did security concerns and the
ideological visions of politicians and public opinion. When one factor had to give
way, it tended to be geopolitics. Economic interests, moreover, determine the
circumstances under which geopolitical ideology could influence policy. Only
where economic interests are weak, diffuse, or indeterminate could national
politicians indulge the temptation to consider geopolitical goals. (p. 6-7)
This approach enables us to accept White’s deterministic model and use its derived
implications to assess the economic and political determinants of European integration
and its impact on the more conservative and reactive sociolinguistic area.
In spite of these insights and the progress made in understanding the evolution
and functioning of sociocultural systems outlined above, the link between economic and
political integration and its overall effect on linguistic situations remains a relatively
unexplored area of research. In this paper, following these insights, approaches, and using
sociolinguistic data analyses, I shall explore how and to what extent increased economic
and political integration within a highly open and pluralistic society impacts linguistic
diversity and how this is creating an unusual linguistic situation in Europe.
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Section II, therefore, presents an overview of the evolution and structure of European
Integration step by step showing the dynamic causal links between the economic and
political spheres. It also examines how the economic-political integration extends to the
sociocultural area through the spillover process mechanism. In this context, section I
serves as the necessary theoretical foundations connecting sections II on economic and
political integration to III and IV on sociolinguistic data that illustrates causal links.
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PART ONE: Section II
An overview of the evolution and structure of European integration: its
determinants and indicators
German aggression was a particularly vicious
outgrowth of a bad general system, and only a
radical and general change of the system of itself
will provide continuous security for all. (David
Mitrany, 1966)
By pooling basic production and by creating a new
high authority whose decisions will be binding on
France, Germany and the other countries who may
subsequently join, this proposal will create the first
concrete foundation for a European federation
which is so indispensable for the preservation of
peace. (Robert Schuman, 1950)
According to Marx and Lenin, as well as to J. A.
Hobson and Charles A. Beard, we ought to expect
economic class or group interests to be decisive, but
the evidence suggests a far more complex picture.
(Deutsch, 1988)
Our concern will be with the political consequences
of economic integration (Lindberg, 1963)
2.1 Economic and political integration as basis for corresponding sociocultural and
sociolinguistic integration
This section outlines an overview of the link between the economic and the political
spheres as the basis for the cultural and social integration and deals primarily with the
nature of their relationships according to the referenced theories and or models in the
previous section. That is, the evolutionary theory or systemic framework, the economic
primacy thesis, the neofunctionalist theory, and the spillover thesis as they relate to the
evolution, development and functioning of the EU system and process by applying
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Burchill’s six criteria against which theories are generally evaluated on:
●
●
●
●
●
●

a theory’s understanding of an issue or process,
a theory’s explanatory power of the theory,
the theory’s success at predicting events,
the theory’s intellectual consistency and coherence,
the scope of the theory, and
the theory’s capacity for critical self-reflection and intellectual engagement with
contending theories. (Burchill, 1996: 24, emphasis in original)

Since at a fundamental level, economic and political integration necessarily leads to
‘cultural integration’ of sorts that generates an inviting environment for sociolinguistic
unity, I intend to show here how the macro co-variables - the economic and the political
arenas - correlate, influence, and affect each other in a dynamic way. Having shown this
in this section II, Sections III and IV complete the paper by showing that this
'economic-political' integration has also ‘spilled over’ into the sociolinguistic area (or
cultural sphere) with various effects and reactions. Section III, therefore, looks at these
cumulative effects on linguistic diversity in Europe which is simply another way of
saying the next section examines the extent to which linguistic integration, or the
linguistic situation, responds or reacts as the cultural correlate alongside developments
within the economic and political areas as described in this section.
2.2  Motivations and formalization
Up to 1951, motivation in a European Integration (EI) process11 project was for
whatever the ‘founders’ said it is:12

Two essential concepts are integration and process.
"Standing up to USA and Japan" is a far above-average reason for "hope" among the French (44 % :
second rank there). It was France alone among EC member states which pressed for counter-sanctions
rather than continued negotiations when the United States threatened trade war against the Community over
the GATT oilseeds dispute in November 1992.” (Source: EUROBAROMETER 38, 1992)
11
12
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●

peace, security, prosperity, freedom,

●

‘an ever closer union,’

●

restoring European influence in the world,

●

and more specifically the anchoring of Germany into binding post-war European
institutions, etc.

The decision by Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands to
sign the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) Treaty on April 18, 1951, brought
about the initial formalization of what has become the dynamic EI process. The Treaty
entered into force on July 27, 1952. This development has had its necessary corollary,
and there is evidence economies of scale derived from the ECSC have had beneficial
effects for the rest of the integrated six-nation economies. Although the observed growth
rates varied widely among each of the common market products, the overall performance
by the whole sector was significant. From 1952 to 1956, with a limited but well-defined
agenda, yearly economic growth among the member countries increased noticeably in all
the ECSC products; the production of coal, iron ore, crude steel, and scrap increased by
4, 22, 31, and 12-18 per cents respectively, according to Haas (2004: 67)13. The sharp
increase in the volume of trade within the ECSC countries in the commodities under
review during the period from 1952 to 1955 reflect this success: trade in coal grew to
140, iron ore to 137, steel products to 251, and scrap to 457 (1952 = 100). As noted by
Haas (2004: 63), “The volume of trade in ECSC products rose by 93 per cent between
1952 and 1955, while the increase in trade in all other sectors liberalized under the OEEC

13

Originally published by Stanford University Press in 1958.
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code, but not under the common market, amounted to only 59 per cent in the same
period”, suggesting further growth could be generated by the addition of cognate sectors
through expansion of the common market. Statistically, these are meaningful results as
they are consistent with the logic or intended effect of market integration and spillover
effects.

The

implication

of

this

sector-to-sector,

sector-to-economy,

and

economy-to-economy growth relationships in the context of one of the key questions
being addressed in this paper is that there appears to be a significant link between the
ECSC sector performance, economic growth of its member states, and the overall
evolution of the integration process as caused by “the growth of capital interpenetration
inside the Common Market” according to Mandel (1967:31). In other words, as predicted
by the ‘neofunctionalist theory.’
2.3 The neofunctionalist theory and economic primacy
It is a theory of regional integration developed in the mid-1950s as an approach to the
integration of individual sectors mainly within the economic sphere at first with
expectations of achieving spillover effects to other areas that further the process by which
countries additionally remove barriers to free trade and other forms of interactions
employing formal treaties.
Haas (1958), Deutsch (1963), and to some extent Lindberg (1963) pioneered the study
of European integration which focused on the performance and integrative mechanism of
the ECSC. Their work at the beginning of the 1950s used the ECSC as a case study in
analyzing the processes and mechanisms of economic integration occurring across state
boundaries which, in their view, would lead to the uniting of Europe. In Haas (1958), he
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argued, based on his observations, the growth of the integration process was driven by a
positive spillover mechanism between related sectors arising as a consequence of modest
economic integration in initial sectors. According to him, “Converging economic goals
embedded in the bureaucratic, pluralistic, and industrial life of modern Europe provided
the crucial impetus. The economic technician, the planner, the innovating industrialist,
and trade unionist advanced the movement not the politician, the scholar, the poet, the
writer.” (Haas, 1968: xix, emphasis added). Haas (1958) used a deterministic trending
approach in his analysis which implies once the initial political decision is made on
economic integration, such as the one exercised by the leadership of Jean Monnet, Robert
Schuman and others on the creation of the ECSC, continued automatic economic
leakages and linkages between ‘cognate’ sectors would ensure the rest of the process.
Under this assumption, he contended this development process would be path-dependent
as integration in one sector creates pressure as well as the condition for further integration
in related sectors as a result of new demands and presumably the need to maintain overall
structural equilibrium within the overall system. He also maintained that the process was
inherently expansive and that it would lead to ‘the eventual loss of the individual identity
of the ECSC through its absorption into what became the new European Community.’
The ECSC has since lost its identity into what became the EU which is still expanding
and evolving, composed of such bodies and institutions as the European Commission,
Parliament, Council, and the Court of Justice. Their studies involved applying statistical
as well as qualitative analyses on a variety of integration variables seeking to demonstrate
a positive correlation between sector performance, economic growth, and the further
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development of the overall process. While they all agreed on the logic of integration,
Haas view of the process was that economic considerations were the driven force
whereas for Lindberg (1963), it was more of a political process that involve public
feedback, actor-socialization, and side-payments. That is, in order to get the process
function and move forward, one must get the support of as many individual
decision-makers and groups as have vested interests in the outcomes. Meaning, the
process was, for the most part, due to processes of political feedback or responses to
political problems. As Deutsch (1988) who treated the EC as an example of regional
integration puts it,
Feedback signals, we have said, may be used to bring about an increase or a
decrease in the intensity and/or frequency of the original behavior that gave rise to
them. If the feedback always increases the intensity and/or the frequency of the
original behavior, then it is called positive or amplifying feedback; and it will
drive the original behavior of the system higher and higher until some element in
the system or in its environment breaks down, or until some essential resource or
supply is exhausted. (p. 90)
In fact, according to him (1988), the “Feedback works in cycles: from action to echo (that
is, to the return of messages about the results of that action), and then from echo to
reaction (that is - as the next step - either to a repetition of the original action or to an
action at least somewhat different from the original)” (p. 90).
Haas methodology and the validity of some of their assumptions have been disputed
on several grounds, however. In particular, Hoffmann (1966) criticized the general
problem arising from modeling the sector-by-sector integration deterministically which
he argues was rather driven by individual state interest considerations. Moreover, Pollack
(1997) and Moravcsik (1998) noted the importance of this bias not only in the original
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model’s lack of emphasis on the primary role played by the states in initiating the
direction and pace of the integration process but also the influence exerted by other
domestic actors on the process. Furthermore, as Moravcsik argues, contrary to Haas
expectations, European integration appeared to strengthen the nation-states, not weaken
them, and any power delegated at the supranational level results from deliberate decisions
by national governments in a principal-agent context where the States act as the
principals. His “... contention is that major integration decisions- and multilateral
negotiations over international cooperation more generally - are better explained with
more narrowly focused yet more broadly generalizable ‘mid-range’ theories of economic
interest, bargaining, and institutional choice drawn from the general literature on
international cooperation” (Moravcsik, 1998:19). More significantly, Holland (1980)
pointed out their studies failure to place the neofunctionalist analysis14 within the narrow
context of Western European particular experience and questioned their generalization
and predictive validity. He argues EI may be unique, a sui generis, to the Western
European economic, political, and cultural experience and hence incapable of fully
describing the processes of regional integrations in general. Furthermore, he points out
under the process the assumption of economic growth through spillover as ‘linear,
smooth and homogeneous, rather than staggered, uneven, highly diverse and
differentiated’ on a range of areas may be an unrealistic depiction of the actual process
and consequently, the Haas deterministic model could not be valid.
2.4 ‘Spillover’ and the other ‘spill-’ concepts

14

A perspective that past integration drives the whole integration process.
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Schmitter (1971), Sandholtz and Stone Sweet (1998), Haas (2004), and others
subsequently tried to address some of the criticisms and shortcomings inherent in the
original approach by taking into account not only the crucial role played by States as
insisted by the Intergovernmental analysts but also the impact of other intermediaries and
non-state domestic actors. In its most general formulation, according to Lindberg
(1963:10), “‘spill-over’ refers to a situation in which a given action, related to a specific
goal, creates a situation in which the original goal can be assured only by taking further
actions, which in turn create a further condition and a need for more action, and so forth.”
The theoretical underpinnings of the original neo-functionalist model as outlined by Haas
himself “assumed that integration would proceed quasi-automatically as demands for
additional central services intensified because the central institutions proved unable to
satisfy the demands of their new clients. Thus, activities associated with sectors
integrated initially would ‘spill over’ into neighboring sectors not yet integrated, but now
becoming the focus of demands for more integration” (2004: xv). His model conceived of
the spillover process as being limited mainly to the economic sectors but postulated an
eventual Europe-level macro-polity outcome, nevertheless. It envisioned the continuing
rise of new central institutions whose function would be to harmonize, homogenize,
standardize and coordinate macro-policy differences among the member states, a process
which would also simultaneously and gradually weaken the European nation-state
system.
This concept of micro-spillover which is within cognate sectors and macro-spillover is
is between the economic and political spheres, while remaining the key aspect of the
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model of integration as formerly devised by Haas and the neofunctionalist school, has
since been refined to incorporate additional strategies of integration to account for the
uneven processes of ‘spill-back’, ‘spill-around’, ‘encapsulation’ (‘the inclusion of one
thing within another thing so that the included thing is not apparent’) (Schmitter,
1971:242), and the growth of further unintended developments to better reflect the
complexity and multi-process and multi-level dynamics which have significantly
transformed European economic integration into a political union, the EU (Sandholtz,
and Sweet Stone, 1998). Rosamond (2000) sums up the basic neo-functionalist reasoning,
logic, or argument like this:
Two or more countries agree to work for integration in a given economic sector
(sector a). To accomplish this task more effectively, they agree to appoint a
supranational bureaucracy - a ‘high authority’ to use the parlance of the time - to
oversee operations. While the integration of sector a achieves some of the
supposed benefits, the full advantage of integration will not be achieved unless
cognate economic sectors are also drawn into the integrative web. In any case, the
integration of a creates functional linkage pressures for related sectors b and c to
become part of the game. There are two other more or less automatic processes in
the neofunctionalist model. First, economic integration automatically generates an
increased level of transactions between actors within the integrating region.
Second, as we have seen, because of the essential group characteristic of politics,
there is a tendency for new interest organizations to form at the regional level.
This is particularly true of producer groups… whose interests shift (and indeed
arise) as new levels of integration are accomplished. Meanwhile, the high
authority becomes a key sponsor of further integration. Thus, it develops
strategies (corresponding to its own emerging interests) to accomplish the twin
goals of deeper economic integration in an expanding range of economic sectors
and the increased institutionalization of authority at the regional level. To some
extent, the high authority achieves this by acting as a constant advocate of the
advantages of integration and by pointing to the relationships that exist between
sectors a, b and c. (p. 58)
This review of the spillover mechanism is consistent with the generalizations offered by
Haas and others and shows that while it depends on prior intergovernmental bargains,
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once a decision is made, it functions on a logic of its own.
It is the key theoretical innovation forming the basis of the revised neo-functionalist
model which admittedly demonstrates spillovers are apt to follow quite variable paths
within a diverse, multi-path, multi-level, complex system. Thus, through the spillover
dynamics of integration, “In Europe, what began as piecemeal problem-solving for the
member states - underpinned by the peace motive - has ended up in a supranational order
subjecting the constituent parts to collectively binding decisions”15 (Eriksen, 2010:10). It
shows that the systemic crisis the process experienced in the mid-1960s - as well as the
current Europe-wide refugee crisis - was and is, rather than disproving the deterministic
theory of spillover, merely the result of the punctuated counter-actions of the logic of
integration in some areas with that of the logic of diversity as indicated by divergent
national preferences on almost everything else.
2.5 An interactive timeline of macro-spillover process in the form of ‘this then that,
that then this…’
In spite of the complex, uneven, and slow pace of the integration process, the overall
developments following the initial, positive performance of the ECSC suggest Haas’
model could not be rejected. On the contrary, a short survey of the growth of additional
treaties (or credible commitments) and mechanisms to further the process shows that the
basic spillover thesis remained by and large valid and consistent with much of what Haas
had predicted. Two additional Treaties: the European Economic Community (EEC) or
‘Common Market’, and the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) establishing

15

David Mitrany (1888-1975) saw that part of the root of international conflict was due the division of the
world, and Europe in particular, into competing and rival political units.
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further economic integration were signed on March 25, 1957. They entered into force on
January 1, 1958. In sharp contrast to the limited agenda of the ECSC, the EEC had
additional regulatory powers together with the authority to define the future order of
things, marking the first step toward the emergence of a self-regulating and self-directing
European polity - one which, instead of being dictated by individual national interests
would direct their collective interests. This necessitated the establishment of new
Europe-level institutions and brought about a dynamic process of decision-making
innovations which have increasingly led and transformed the EI regime into ‘an ever
closer union.’ On January 14, 1962, bolstered by past successes, prospect for further
economic growth, and additional memberships, which is now at 28 strong member states
providing greater economies of scale, the scope of integration was expanded to include
other key sectors under the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and Single Customs
Union (SCU) which was completed on July 1, 1968, 18 months ahead of schedule. In
1986 the Single European Act (SEA), a major reform of the Rome Treaty (1958),
providing an extra basis for the establishment of the ‘Single Market’ is signed.
Completed in 1993, it amended the rules governing the functioning of the European
institutions and expanded the Central powers adding new momentum to the integration
process.
2.6 Treaty on the European Union, and introduction of the Euro
Furthermore, the ‘Maastricht’ Treaty on the European Union signed in 1991 created
the single European currency, the euro, and the European Union. It opened the way for
increased political integration and European citizenship and represented a new stage in
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European integration. Also, the Treaty of Amsterdam signed in 1997 extended the scope
of co-decision making between the EU and its member states which reformed the pillars
on foreign policy, justice, and home affairs further thereby closing the gap between
economic integration and political cooperation. The treaty also introduced a High
Representative who, together with the Presidents of the European Commission and the
Council, provides a unified EU foreign policy, face, and voice, to the rest of the world.
And the Lisbon Treaty, drafted as a replacement for the Constitutional Treaty and signed
in 2007, aimed at increasing the coherency and consistency of the EU's external actions
while streamlining the system’s decision-making structures. It clarified which powers
belong to the member states, which ones belong to the EU and those that are shared
between the two - through the principle of subsidiarity.
Collectively, these series of treaties showing the gradual growth of the integration
process demonstrates more significantly the formal macro-spillover from the economic
sphere to the political one as envisaged by Haas and defined by Lindberg (1963):
Political integration is (1) the process whereby nations forgo the desire and ability
to conduct foreign and key domestic policies independently of each other, seeking
instead to make joint decisions or to delegate the decision-making process to new
central organs; and (2) the process whereby political actors in several distinct
settings are persuaded to shift their expectations and political activities to a new
center. (p. 6)
In fact, Lindberg's definition was simply a restatement of Haas formulations (2004)
according to which “the process whereby political actors in several distinct national
settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations, and political activities towards
a new center, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the pre-existing
national states” (p.16).
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2.7 The Schengen Agreement as spillover into labor, sociocultural, and language
issues
Furthermore, the Schengen Agreement signed in 1985, the parallel form of social
integration comparable to the economic and political integrations initially created
independently of the European Union but now incorporated into it, aimed for much of the
gradual abolition of border controls between member states. As a result, the agreement
has increased people's, socioeconomic and cultural interactions between Europeans. And
while for the most part the series of treaties before 1985 were notably designed to address
and smooth the progress of the economic and/or political integration, the Schengen
Agreement, in particular, marked the first formalization of the macro-spillover into the
sociocultural domain, a spillover whose effect we will look at closely in the next sections
as it relates to issues of European citizen interactions, linguistic diversity, communication
and mutual intelligibility, and the need for a common language for Europe. It
demonstrates relationships between the integration processes at the economic and
political levels and the sociocultural sphere (cultural links, common norms, movement
and communications), though sometimes lagging and complex, are interrelated and feed
on each other, nonetheless; implying that the decision to omit or side step main issues
related to the sphere of culture from the earlier treaties was merely a strategic choice
rather than one of substance. In the words of Jean Monnet (1978), ‘To succeed, always
choose the path of least resistance.’16 Or as Haas (2004) noted,
Taking literally the text of the Treaty which calls on the High Authority to ‘orient
and facilitate’ the initiative of the governments in creating a free labour market,
the High Authority in 1953 worked out a series of proposals. They asserted the
16

page 18, The Choice for Europe, Moravcsik (1998)
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right of qualified workers to seek [Haas emphasis to contrast it with to ‘accept’ an
offer] employment free from immigration and passport restrictions, other than
those concerned with health and public order, recommended the issuing of an
ECSC labour card to all qualified personnel which would entitle them to
migrate… (p. 498)
As such, the macro-spillover from the economic-political spheres to the sociocultural
field shows that deepening economic and political integration beyond a certain level
between nations or regions is incompatible with the legal restriction of the free movement
of persons living within the integrated area. In fact, labor mobility is one of the key
conditions for successful, long term, integration according to Deutsch et al. (1957).17 It
also suggests integration, at least of the sort pursued by Europe, the union of peoples
rather than just the union of States, would be attained not only by the formal but also by
the informal forms of interactions which involve social interactions, information, and
cultural exchanges, and so on. The official form of integration alone isn’t necessarily a
sufficient indicator of integration: as noted by De Witte (1990:208), “A comparative
analysis of the three bilateral relationships established between Britain, France, and
Germany clearly shows that the formal links between France and Germany are
qualitatively superior to those established by either of those two with Britain; for
informal links, however, the picture is exactly the opposite.” As Romero also tells us
(1992:190), “Integration in Western Europe is extended primarily by informal factors.
The formal level of integration - although not a prerequisite for most of these phenomena
- can, however, activate a more complex interplay among various flows, which will
ultimately alter their nature and extend their range.”

17

P136, The European Union: Readings on the Theory and Practice of European Integration, third ed., 2003
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This classic formal-informal spillover, according to which the unintended
consequences of increasing political cooperation and cultural exchanges gradually grow
from closer economic integration and interdependence, validated by the observed process
on EI, strongly confirms the underlying link between the overall integration process and
the pattern of increased cultural flows. And thus the developments of the EU system are
not only consistent with the core idea of the neofunctionalist model; they moreover
exhibit the general, systemic growth patterns by which systems increase in both size and
complexity as noted in Section I (White, 1959; Johnson, 1982). In fact, as envisaged by
the theory, an institutional spillover can also be seen to have occurred through not only
the deepening of integration between the original six members but also the enlargement
that now includes 28 members. Meaning, as Keohane and Hoffman (1990) put it, “A new
form of spillover, not from one economic sector to another but from one institutional
dimension to another, took place.” Thus, thanks to the developments that have taken
place since 1951, the process now offers a rich and full characterization not only of when
and how it has evolved - but also how it will quite predictably continue to grow in the
future.
2.8 ‘The expansive logic of sector integration’ and growth of the integrative
mechanisms
The growth of the original feature of European integration, the ECSC, and how it has
evolved into its present form, the European Union, offers a clear case study on the
various mechanisms of the integration process in particular and the dynamic evolutionary
processes of sociocultural systems in general. A complete process of Europeanization is
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taking place, and various integrative mechanisms and strategies have evolved or been
adopted to address the complexities and multidimensional aspects of the process showing
that it is also changing in a systemic form and through differential allocation of functions
among its parts: the states, regions, central institutions, businesses, etc., according to
varied means or formulations the key of which is the principle of subsidiarity based on
efficiency, competency, and economy.
2.9.1 ‘The principle of subsidiarity’ as separation of functions/powers within the EU
The principle of subsidiarity, also related to the idea of the separation of powers or
checks-and-balances principle in the US, is intended to ensure decisions are taken as
closely as possible at the best possible level: at the citizen, local, national, regional or
European level. Specifically, it is the principle whereby the central institutions of the
Union, except in the areas which fall within their exclusive competence, do not take
action unless it is more effective than action taken at local, national or regional levels. It
is directly bound up with the related principles of necessity and proportionality, which
require that any action by the Union or Central Institutions should not go beyond what is
necessary to achieve the objectives of the treaties.
2.9.2 The ‘multi-speed,’ the ‘enhanced cooperation’ form of differentiated
integration
The ‘multi-speed’ type of differentiated integration adopted by the EU allows
common objectives to be pursued first by a group of member states both willing and able
to proceed in a chosen area with the implication others will follow later when ready and
able. It represented a different mechanism from the unanimity procedure which addressed
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the questions of how far and how fast the process can go. Multi-speed based on the core
idea of common but differentiated capacity within the system. In other words, it
recognizes that certain areas, states, or regions within the system do not progress or
function at the same pace in all given areas as is formalized in the ‘enhanced cooperation’
framework, thus, recognizing the fact that the European Union consists of uneven regions
or subsystems which have achieved different levels of formal or informal integration.
2.9.3 The ‘variable-geometry’ form of differentiated integration
The ‘variable-geometry,’ which allows states ‘opt-outs’ from existing and new common
European rules, represents another method of differentiated integration showing that
there are sometimes irreconcilable functional or structural variances among the member
states. The Schengen project and regime is an example of this variable geometry. Another
related non-uniform form of integration is the Europe ‘a la carte’ procedure or construct
which permits member states to select policies/areas of action as if from a set and then
fully proceed in those items with the assumption there would be a minimum number of
common objectives pursued. The Cohesion policy, implemented through a ‘structural’
Fund, for regional development initiatives, illustrates the need to smooth over national or
regional differences and reduce the effects of asymmetry in the system.
These differentiated, uneven processes of integration show that, in practice, different
mechanisms or formulations are required to bring together within a single institutional
framework what was formerly separate, mostly disconnected and various national entities
in Europe. In principle, the spillovers between sectors and/or spheres, however, show
there is a given directional pattern of flow of exchange which illustrate causal
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connections within the dynamic system. The observation here on the primacy of the
economic sphere as the essential generator of integration activities in the process as well
as the fact that the parts of the system do not all change at uniform speed or in a single
direction, follows the general thesis of economic determinacy theorized in section I.
That is, the basic outline described here in terms of the primary trend and timeline of
the integration process is also consistent with the Sweet and Sandholtz (2003)
observations and formulation on “Why does movement on any of the dimensions
[spheres] occur in the first place?” and “Why do some policy domains move farther and
faster toward the supranational pole than others?” (p.227). This is a detailed assessment
of that by the two authors (2003):
Our starting point is society, in particular, non-state actors who engage in
transactions and communications across national borders, within Europe. These
are the people who need European standards, rules, and dispute resolution
mechanisms - who need supranational governance. In the beginning, the causal
mechanism is quite simple: increasing levels of cross-border transactions and
communications by societal actors will increase the perceived need for European
level rules coordination, and regulation. In fact, the absence of European rules
will come to be seen as an obstacle to the generation of wealth and the
achievement of other collective gains. Separate national legal regimes constitute
the crucial source of transaction costs for those who wish to engage in exchanges
across borders: customs and other border controls, different technical standards,
divergent health and environmental regulations, distinct systems of commercial
law, divers national currencies, and so on. Further, the cost of transacting across
borders are higher than those involved in contracting within a single
member-state, to the extent that there exists no secure common legal framework
at the supranational level, comparable in its efficacy to that of national legal
systems. As transnational exchanges rise, so does the societal demand for
supranational rules and organizational capacity to regulate. Transactors can exert
pro-integration pressure on their own governments, but when these are reticent,
transactors can access supranational arenas dominated by the Commission and the
European Court of Justice.
Government actors clearly have their own interests, which may include
maximizing their autonomy and control over resources. They may resist the shift
toward supranational policymaking. But as they do so, they inhibit the generation
of wealth within their territory by those actors that depend on European
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transactions. Such resistance is therefore sustainable only at a cost in prosperity.
They can also attempt to slow integration or push it in directions favorable to their
perceived interests, but they do not drive the process or fully control it. In a
fundamental sense, governments are reactive, constantly adjusting to the
integration that is going on all around them. (p. 228)
That is, the EU, functionally, like all dynamic systems, has the natural tendency to
regulate itself, and changes in one area or sphere are primarily therapeutic in nature to
make the system not just efficient but also more symmetrical, balanced, and therefore
towards stability or a state of dynamic equilibrium as economists prefer to call it.
From the above analytic description of the behavior of European integration, the
developments described within its evolutionary process, namely, that economic
integration leads political coordination (unity), which in turn result in sociocultural
integration, are highly consistent with the functionalist logic of change envisioned and set
up by Jean Monnet (1888-1979) and others as reviewed in Section I and the
neofunctionalist model presented and analyzed by Haas and others discussed in this
section II according to which the structure of interrelated sectors or spheres of society
changes when one or more of its subsystems change by means of spillover causal
mechanisms. Thus, in ‘Europe needs more economic integration’ Josep Borrell Fontelles,
former President of the European Parliament (2004-2007), identifies what he called a
structural flaw in the EU according to which “while there is a common currency, the
euro, there is no international governing body that determines fiscal strategies for the
member -states, leading to inconsistencies in policy.”18 In other words, the logic of
monetary Union requires a corresponding fiscal union to avoid inconsistencies in policy
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http://www.thecrimson.com/article/2014/10/15/EU-president-talks-fiscal-policy/

45

which Sweet and Sandholtz referred to as ‘costs.’ As Balassa (1961) noted, “total
economic integration presupposes the unification of monetary, fiscal, social, and
countercyclical policies and requires the setting-up of a supra-national authority whose
decisions are binding for the member states.” So while fiscal union is needed by the logic
of monetary union, the spillover thesis says that, if the integration process continues,
sooner rather than later, there would be a fiscal union for the EU. This means for an
entire integration process to fully proceed on all interacting key subsystem areas, it must
proceed along the lines suggested by anthropological theories based on the overall nature
of sociocultural systems, processes and culture changes.
It is therefore not surprising to see also a parallel form of ‘legal integration’ otherwise
regarded as ‘institutional spillover’ - the process of evolving sets of legal arrangements
within the system which bind sovereign States on rights and obligations that keeps the
system strengthen itself as well as setting in motion the whole process of enlargement.
The set of laws, and the growth of legal elements, otherwise the translations into
operational terms of policies, constitute therefore a good indicator or measure of the state
of the integration process. This proves, or rather shows, that overall European integration
is a multi-speed, multi-sphere and multi-faceted process that includes other areas. As De
Witte (1990) put it,
The growing involvement of the European Community in culture and in education
would seem to provide an excellent illustration, and partial vindication, of
functionalist theories of integration. ‘Spillover’ into the cultural sphere takes
place, roughly speaking, as follows. Market integration for economic activities
implicitly but directly affects culture in its material form, but thereby also
indirectly in its symbolic significance. National cultural policies are limited by
those rules on market integration much more effectively than by any other explicit
form of cultural cooperation. This limitation of national powers may, in turn, lead
to the perception that some forms of regulation, to be effective, must be
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transferred to the European level, in order to counterbalance the undesirable
effects of market integration. All this constitutes a dynamic process which does
not, at any given time, present a perfect equilibrium between the ‘negative’ and
‘positive’ dimensions of integration, but instead is marked by major integration
deficits which keep the process in motion. (p. 198) (emphasis added)
Conclusion
Following this overview of the ‘evolution and structure of European Integration’ which
confirms that economic integration beyond a certain level does indeed lead to political
integration or unity, we therefore expect to see strong, clear, and measurable effects that
have been generated by the economic and political integration process on the linguistic
situation since it's being argued in this and in the previous sections that changes occurring
in any one or more subsystems or spheres of a system impact the other spheres through
the now well-familiar spillover process. And since the main aim of this paper is to look at
the impact on the sociolinguistic situation, no further analysis is pursued concerning the
chain of events, detailed examination of causal links, or exact nature and direction of
causality between the economic and political spheres. Nor do we undertake a further
separate analysis of the economic and political areas in part because economic integration
and political coordination (unity), as we have shown, interact and reinforce each other on
various levels and in interesting ways well beyond the intended scope of this paper.
Since the more formal treaties aim to eradicate or minimize economic obstacles and
political differences within the EU for the development of 'an ever closer Union' whereas
the official language position of the EU is for that member states to promote their
national identity and language(s), according to the motto, 'United in Diversity', we detect
a notable contradiction within the system of some apparent mutually opposing or
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cancelling forces or strategies: the logic of unity within the economic and political
spheres which brings Europeans together on one hand, and the logic of diversity within
the sociocultural and linguistic spheres acting as negative integration, on the other. Thus,
we introduce four main potential paths19 of Europeanization through one of which the
overall process with its effects will continue to express itself in Europe:
a) cultural diversity and linguistic diversity,
b) cultural unity and linguistic diversity,
c) cultural diversity and linguistic unity, and
d) cultural unity and linguistic unity.
The next section shows developments toward sociolinguistic integration including that
of an evolving hierarchy of languages and the emergence of a common language. As
White (1975:61) reminded us about languages and their nature, “Languages are not
merely inert forms; they are dynamic systems. They grow and change... They compete
with one another; some become archaic or extinct” - all of which is to say, man’s
socio-economic, political, and cultural life are all interconnected, interdependent,
dynamic, and that changes in one aspect necessarily lead to corresponding alterations in
the others.

19

Potentially, it is my own conception
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PART TWO: Sections III
Effect of economic integration and political centralization on linguistic diversity in
Europe
The study of language history shows that if two
social groups come to be separated only by a
mountain range or a wide river, they will soon begin
to develop different habits of speech (Crystal,
2003)
Genetically related languages form language
families and they show systematic and recurrent
formal correspondences, i.e. similarities and
differences which are too regular and frequent to be
mere chance or the result of borrowing. (Herbert
Schendl, 2001)
Some languages (Italian & Spanish, Czech and
Polish) are so close that speakers of one can
understand the other to some degree. How to use
this asset for a diverse European society?
(Intercomprehension: A linguistic phenomenon the
EU Commission)
Languages are not merely inert forms; they are
dynamic systems. They grow and change. Grimm’s
Law expresses certain tendencies in Indo-European
languages. Languages differentiate, become
diversified into sublanguages and dialects. They
compete with one another; some become archaic or
extinct. They are an essential part of everything that
people do as human beings… Languages may
inspire people to fight - even to the death - to decide
which language shall be the official language of a
province or city... (White. 1975)
3.1 Europe, language diversity, and why history of languages is important for
language learning and policymaking in the EU
In section I, I introduced the anthropological approaches and other theoretical
foundations upon which to situate, observe, and analyze both the micro- and macro-levels
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of sociocultural and politico-economic systems and their characteristics or tendencies.
This contextualization was necessary because properly considered, European integration
and the EU is one such evolving system. Section II has examined the dynamically
interactive link between the economic and political spheres of this process or system and
has reviewed its evolution and structure from the 1950s to the present as is generally
discussed in the literature.
In this section, we look at the diversity and unity of languages in Europe showing the
altering nature of sociolinguistic situations and how that affects the present state. It shows
how preferential national policies helped created hierarchies of languages in every
country and how national languages such as English, French, German, and Russian have
emerged as more dominant regional languages mainly as a result of their countries sizes.
Shown in this Section and the next one is also how the present integration is creating a
similar linguistic situation and hierarchy of languages with English emerging as the most
favored one, at least for now - suggesting an interesting dynamic situation of competition
and complementarity among languages has emerged. According to a recent European
Commission Press Release (2012)20 , “Almost nine out of ten EU citizens believe that the
ability to speak foreign languages is very useful, and 98% say that mastering languages
will be good for the future of their children, according to a new Eurobarometer opinion
poll on EU citizens' attitudes towards multilingualism and foreign language learning.”
While the focus of most European integration studies has been about understanding
the relationship between the economic and political spheres as observed in the previous
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section, less attention has been paid to the impact of the process on the more reactive
sociolinguistic domain. Increased global interconnection, heightened interdependence
and deepening European integration all occasioned by advanced technology
developments in transport and communication systems, which allow greater movements
and interactions of people, goods, services, and capital, mean that Europe’s languages are
also increasingly coming into closer contact in a variety of ways to complement and to
compete with one another in what is a highly pluralistic and open European society21. The
European Commission reflecting the heterogeneous political and social facts within its
institutions and member-states commits itself to the principle of "unity in diversity" and
has set up research studies22 particularly devoted to the understanding of the overall
effects of the integration process on the diversity of national cultures, especially as
related to linguistic differences and language use. It is part of a concerted effort in
formulating strategies aimed at synchronizing concrete economic and political everyday
realities with corresponding changes within the sociolinguistic sphere. This section
discusses the evolution of Europe’s linguistic diversity and the emergence of present-day
‘national languages’ as a result of barriers built around constructed political borders that
came with the creation of nation-states; it shows the effect of economic integration and
political centralization on linguistic diversity in Europe.
3.2 Evolution of linguistic diversity in Europe: its geographical, historical, and
political factors

21

Increased global interconnection, heightened interdependence all occasioned by advanced
technology developments in transport and communication systems which allow greater movement
and interaction of people, goods, services, and capital constitutes the paper’s antecedent condition
- the phenomenon whose presence activated or magnified the operation of the causal variable (s)
22
The Eurobarometer and the Eurostat
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Linguistically, Europe is both ‘diverse’ and ‘homogenous’ mainly from the fact that
most of its languages are intimately linked not just by such geography and political
factors but also by a common ancestor: Indo-European, the hypothetical ancient language
which shared

common ancestry with the Indo-Iranian family of languages (Edwards,

2013). And there are three main factors that have shaped Europe’s diverse linguistic
kinships

and

histories,

namely:

the

geographical,

historical

and

political.

Geographically, the major language boundaries and distributions are the Greco-Slavic
languages of southeastern Europe, the Latin languages of southern Europe, the Celtic
languages of southwestern Europe and the Germanic languages of northwestern Europe.
Historically, population migrations within and between the regions have been one of
the main factors that produced language situations: population dispersals have led to
language divergence or the emergence of different languages while contacts between
communities have brought about language convergence or similarities. That is, the
contacts almost always allow exchanges between languages in the form of linguistic
features such as lexical, syntactic, phonological, and morphological which leave historic
marks on all the languages concerned. There is evidence that population movements have
contributed to the distribution and redistribution of languages and linguistic features
across Europe that gave rise to the present differences and similarities. what What was
once single speech communities or languages have been transformed into various
varieties or distinct languages by population migrations.23 They have brought speakers of
different languages into contact with one another in which some languages emerged as
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Such as when the Roman provinces split into distinct own languages: French, Spanish,
Portuguese
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mixed or dominant languages such English in the UK and Ireland and French in France
and Belgium, and they have also caused other languages to thrive24 or to disappear
through processes well known to linguists (Crystal, 2000). The Roman Empire’s
extension into what was its Provinces of France, Spain, Portugal, and the British Isles, for
example, led to the spread of the Roman language, Latin, to what are today the other
Latin languages of French, Spanish, and Portuguese with English as the exception
because of a later spread of the Anglo-Saxon languages into England.
Politically, the relatively recent evolution of the nation-states in Europe also has
played a significant role that produced its own modern linguistic situations and dynamics
in which politically favored languages were chosen and promoted, while others demoted.
And in some cases, few languages even found a home in more than one state as a result
of the demarcations of state territoriality and sovereignty (Nelde, 1997) - a situation the
present integration process is slowly reversing as it weakens or does away with national
borders. Languages that were promoted and protected by States such as French, English,
Spanish, for example, became today’s dominant national languages. Those that were
demoted or undefended remained minority or marginal languages such as Breton in
France or Cornish in England, for instance, while the ones that were split between or
spread across different States emerged as overlapping regional languages. German, which
is widely spoken in Central Europe and is co-official language in Germany, Switzerland,
Austria, etc., is a good example of a regional language split between nation states. Thus,
in some cases, people found themselves speaking a minority language in one area even
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The Breton and Celtic languages are thriving languages
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though they belonged to a linguistic majority in another adjacent region or state. As
Anderson (2012) tells us, “Centuries of French governments have striven to make that
country linguistically uniform” with French as the favored language at the expense of
many others: Basque, Breton, the Germanic language spoken in Alsace, Gascon, Picard,
Provencal and several more that are “as different from ‘French’ in at least some cases as,
for instance, Spanish is from Portuguese” (p. 13).
Due to its diversity in unity, linguists therefore generally classify European languages
into more or less four linguistic kinships that share clear cognate features and structural
similarities across broad linguistic areas such as vocabulary, morphology, structure,
syntax, grammar, etc. That is, the four groups are ‘West Romance, South Slavic, North
Slavic, West Germanic, Scandinavian’ (Romaine, 1994). Though intra-group languages
such as French and Spanish should, in principle, have more commonalities with one
another than languages between groups such as Swedish and Italian, some languages
exhibit features that are common to more than one group. This is explained by factors
such as language ‘contacts’ and ‘spread’ over an area. For instance, English which
developed in the British Isles due to such contact, is mainly a West Germanic language in
its structure, grammar, and basic vocabulary though it has nearly twice as many words
derived from Latin, French and Greek roots. Therefore it hardly fit neatly into these
categories, whereas an isolate language like Basque
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does not have

known close

genealogical kinship to any existing modern European language. This is how Schendl
(2001) explains linguistic evidence due to contact of languages:
In the history of practically every language, we come across syntactic
25

The Basque are an indigenous people inhabiting the Basque Country in southwestern France and
parts of northern Spain.
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constructions that were once foreign to that language but which were (or are)
common constructions in other languages with which the language in question
was in contact. In studying such syntactic innovations linguists may, and often
have, come to the conclusion that a change was brought about by ‘syntactic
borrowing’. Cases in point in the history of English are the use of the absolute
participle … in imitation of the Latin ablativus absolutus … ; the employment of
subjectless relatives in Middle English (ascribed to French …); the development
of peri-phrastic do (due to Celtic …), etc. (p. 102-103)
As Crystal (2003) explains, that is why English speakers often have the luxury of
choice from multiple parallel lexicons; one can say 'kingly' from the Anglo-Saxon
language; 'royal' from French; or say 'regal' from Latin. That is to say, English is
essentially a mixture of Germanic, French, Latin - and Celtic - making it the lucky
recipient of all kinds of loanwords and linguistic features (p.23). In other words,
according to Schendl (2001), the ability to say or express an idea in English with different
words similar in meaning as well as “the use of the absolute participle … in imitation of
the Latin ablativus absolutus …; the employment of subjectless relatives in Middle
English (ascribed to French …); the development of peri-phrastic do (due to Celtic …),
etc.” all is due to this history of language contact (p. 102-103).
The following table is an example showing why English speakers often have this
luxury of choice from multiple parallel lexicons.
Table 1: English words identical in meaning of Germanic/Dutch and
Latin/French origin
English
god/deity
holy/sacred
harbor/port
hate/detest
first/primary
foretell/predict

German/Dutch
god
holy
harbor
hate
first
foretell

Latin/French
deity
sacred
port
detest
primary
predict
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help/assist
help
lawful/legal
lawful
answer/respond
answer
meet/encounter
meet
height/altitude
height
hardship/difficulty
hardship
Other (O.E)/different other
seem/appear
seem
old/ancient
old
teach/educate
teach
tell/narrate
tell
work/labor
work
wild/savage
wild
wage/salary
wage
whole/entire
whole
tongue/language
tongue

assist
legal
respond
encounter
altitude
difficulty (dis-facultas)
different
appear
ancient
educate
narrate
labor
savage
salary
entire
language

Source: Various
Nearly the ‘whole/entire’ English ‘tongue/language’ vocabulary can be traced to these
donor languages. To further appreciate how English has evolved, the table below
demonstrates how its words have been modified, for instance, from the Germanic forms.
Table 2: English words of Germanic origin
English
god
holy
good
green
world
water
over
help
answer
see
self
other*(O.E)
speak

German (or Dutch)
gott
heilig
gut
grun
welt
wasser
uber
helfen
andswaru
sehen
selbe/zelf
ander
sprechen /spreken
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motherspeak26
friend
love

muttersprache
freund27
lufu/liebe

which

Welche

for
singing
lip
Source: Various28

fur
singen
lippe

The same can be demonstrated of Latin or French origins of the English vocabulary;
in fact, most European languages are related this way. And for English, this special
heritage constitutes some of its strongest appeals as well as one of the best arguments one
can make for its promotion as a shared language for Europe. That is, a language that
derived its heritage from not just the Germanic languages but Latin as well as other
‘non-European’ languages globally (Crystall, 2003).
English, however, also became a major loaner/donor of vocabulary to other languages
such as modern Japanese. The following list shows how English words have been
borrowed, adopted, and then adapted through a process of ‘nativization’ to become part
of the Japanese language in Japan. It is a fascinating instance of role reversal in history
where English itself is now the donor language on such a global scale as to precipitate the
evolution of distinct varieties such as Nigerian English, Indian English, etc in what is
simply being termed ‘World Englishes’29 (Kachru, 1992) or ‘Euro-English’30 (the kind of
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mother tongue - a person’s first language at home
mein freund = my friend, literally
28
More German verbs and their English equivalents can be found in Strutz (1964).
29
varieties of English that have been developed under influenced by the United Kingdom or the
United States
30
I define ‘Euro-English’ as the emergence of a new continent-wide English variety with the
distinctive characteristics of the broader macro-cultural context and overall sociolinguistic situation
of Europe.
27
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compromised English Europeans of diverse backgrounds and nationalities speak when
they interact). It demonstrates the reach and creativity of English and its global status another strong argument for it as most suitable lingua franca in Europe. The following
table presents an example of modern Japanese words of English origin.
Table 3: English words that become Japanese words
English
old
light
desk
boobs
flares
milk
girl
standing
left
taxi
English
lose
salaried man
conveyer belt
school
solar
television
MacDonald’s

Japanese
orudo
raito
denki
bubusu
furea
miruku
garu
sutando
refuto
takushi
ingurisshu
ruzu
sarariman
beruto konbea
sukuru
sora
terebi
makudonarudo

Source: Stanlaw (1992:178-208)
This English-Japanese illustrates how English today is being appropriated not just in
Europe where it shares history with others, but globally as well.
These examples are interesting and significant on several levels: 1/ similarity of
vocabularies with identical meanings between languages supported by history show
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evidence of kinship. 2/ when languages borrow words from one another, the borrowing
languages make sure that the loanwords conform, among other things, to their own
phonological rules (Stanlaw, 1992), and 3/ distance is no barrier for contact and mixture
between languages. This is true in all languages regardless of the period, environment or
nature of their relationships. The English word ‘love’ was a transformation of the original
German form ‘lufu,’ which is also being transformed into Japanese as ‘rabu.’ One can
only imagine what form it would have if the Germans were to borrow the ‘new’ Japanese
word ‘rabu’ and transform it into German since the word is of German origin…
In fact, we know what happens when a word is borrowed, modified and is lent back to
the original loaner: Vendryes (1925) explains:
Sometimes a word which has gone abroad and been lost to us may come back
hundreds of years after. For example, flirt and budget are today borrowings from
English; but we know that they were originally French words which crossed the
channel at an early date. And yet it would be inaccurate to take seriously a
metaphor which compares words to travelers passing and repassing frontiers. It is
no longer an old French word fleurette that comes back to France, but an English
word flirt that is introduced into our modern language. Nor is it the old French
word bogete (little bag) that French people have taken back under the for form
‘budget’; it is a different word, a foreign word, signifying something quite other.
(p. 194)
This brief demonstration of the relatedness of languages is at the heart of evolutionary
or historical linguistics.
3.3 Linguistic diversity and mutual intelligibility in Europe
Nichols (1992) has made a useful distinction between "genetic diversity" and
“structural diversity" of languages that enables us to determine degrees of their
differences and similarities. The latter refers to the amount of disparity exhibited by a
population of languages as a result of adaptation through contact with other languages.
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The relative frequencies of structural features such as the order of Subject, Verb, and
Object (SVO) or "word order and head/dependent type" shown as low or high in a
language or group of languages – is the measure of the degree of structural diversity
between languages. The former, "genetic diversity," is the number of discrete lineages
such Germanic, Greek, Latin, and Slavic and the extent to which individual lineages have
also branched out further such as Germanic into West Germanic, North Germanic, etc. It
deals with relationships between languages which reflect their evolutionary histories and
kinships. By using ‘genetic density,’ the ratio of genetic lineages to square miles within a
geographic area, Nichols (1992:232-237) finds a low level of genetic diversity in Europe.
That is, a majority of Europe’s languages belong to the above-noted four groups and
hence low in genetic diversity while a proportionately fewer of them exhibit marked
structural differences indicative of historic and frequent contacts and spreads. Low
genetic diversity with a low level of structural diversity shows a high similarity between
languages, language convergence, and unity of culture; it has implications on such issues
as mutual intelligibility, difficulty or ease of mutual language learning. Romaine (2000)
has provided an example of just how deeply similar Scandinavian languages or speech
forms are to each other in spite of established political boundaries and superficial
appearances:
A Danish school principal told the story of how she gave a lecture to an audience
in Stockholm from a manuscript which had been translated into Swedish. She
said, ‘They understood me very well. Then I fumbled for an expression, and the
audience cried out, “just talk Danish, you are so easy to understand”. I switched to
Danish, to the great surprise of the Swedes, who understood nothing! They had
thought I was talking Danish all along. (p. 13)
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That is, like Urdu in Pakistan and Hindi in India, Swedish and Danish are counted as
distinct languages though they are similar than, say, Cantonese and Mandarin are to each
other - two languages commonly viewed as dialects of the same language, ‘Chinese.’ As
Anderson (2012) notes,
The putative unity of Chinese’ (as a construct encompassing the Sinitic
languages) thus rests on facts such as the largely shared writing system, the
existence of a standardized form of Mandarin (Putonghua) which is widely used
as a sort of koine, and especially the political unity of the modern Chinese state:
the individual Sinitic languages do not have separate flags, armies, and navies. (p.
63)
This illustration is both interesting and revealing. It is interesting because it
demonstrates how profoundly similar some European ‘languages’ are to each other, and
revealing because it shows how constructed political boundaries have helped promote
behavioral attitudes on perceived language differences between people who live in
different nation-states even when their languages are pretty similar or mutually
intelligible to one another. As James and Lesley Milroy (1997:63) put it, other than those
involving geographical factors, “Separateness of languages is therefore largely the result
of social and political processes, and among these processes, language standardization is
particularly important.” Standardization being, among other things, the preference and
elevation of one language or variety above others and the insistence that people conform
to that standard form of communication for intelligibility, comprehensibility, and
interpretability.
Thus, while geographical isolation and the construction of political borders are key
factors that helped create the environment for the evolution of linguistic diversity and the
preservation of linguistic differences in Europe, language contacts have also brought
61

about the evolution of linguistic hierarchies such as is the case with English, Hindi and
the other languages in modern India (Kachru, 1985, 1990, 1992) and now English and the
other EU languages.
3.4 European integration and the evolving linguistic unity in Europe: its economic,
political, and social factors
Despite some major challenges such as the eurozone crisis and Brexit facing European
integration that is explained elsewhere as well as the fact that the evolving language
situation is still fluid, some results and a clear trend have already begun to attract
attention, posing a number of questions and interpretations for policy positions on issues
of language diversity, multilingualism, and need for a common language. As the evidence
in this section and section iv indicate, the linguistic situation is increasingly adapting to
what has always been an uncertain economic and political landscape as languages
perform different roles and functions within the EU institutions and in European society.
As the sections will show, a few languages have already emerged as the leading
"integrative media" in different geographical areas and social contexts within the
European Union where they now coexist with other national languages. In the remainder
of the section, we examine these emerging linguistic changes as languages both
complement and compete within what is becoming a single ranked linguistic space in
Europe.
We observed in section II a robust and systematic correlation between the growth of
economic integration and the further development of political unity and cultural flows;
the deeper the economic integration, the greater the political coordination or unity. Prima
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facie, this suggests that the link is causal in nature showing that as the process of
economic integration proceeds, more intermediary political structures and institutions
correspondingly have emerged to regulate and harmonize the growing economic links.
We now look at the sociolinguistic data to determine the trend or to what extent the
dynamics of integration impact linguistic diversity. The method involves three steps:
● estimating the languages most known to EU citizens other than mother tongues
(I),
● ranking the languages on a scale deemed useful to learn (II), and
● comparing changes in the demand for second and foreign languages over a period
(III).
And these changes thus are the measures of ‘the effect of economic integration and
political centralization on linguistic diversity in Europe’ in a transformational context.
(I) Estimating the languages most known to EU citizens other than mother tongues
Since nearly all Member States have single or major national languages within their
borders, there is a good correlation between the population size of a State, the size of its
national language or mother tongue, and therefore languages known other than the
mother tongue. Below is a recent data on the population sizes of each EU State31 .
Table 4: The nations of Europe, big and small (506 million total Europeans)
* Countries with More than 10 Million32 Native Speakers:
1. Germany, 81,
2. Turkey, 76 *33
3. France, 66
Source: http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat, Newsrelease 108/2014.
Figures are rounded to the nearest million
33
Turkey is included, considered a European state and in the process of joining the EU
31
32
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4. The United Kingdom, 6434
5. Italy, 60
6. Spain, 47
7. Poland, 39
8. Romania, 20
9. Netherlands, 17
10. Belgium, 11
11. Greece, 11
12. The Czech Republic, 11
13. Portugal, 10
* Countries with More than one Million but less than 10 Million Native Speakers
14. Hungary, 9, 9
15. Sweden, 9, 6
16. Austria, 8
17. Switzerland, 8
18. Bulgaria, 7
19. Serbia, 7
20. Denmark, 6
21. Finland, 5
22. Slovakia, 5
23. Norway, 5
24. Ireland, 5
25. Croatia, 4
26. Lithuania, 3
27. Former Yug. Rep. of Macedonia, 2
28. Slovenia, 2
29. Latvia, 2
30. Estonia, 1
* Countries with less35 than million native speakers:
31. Cyprus 900
32. Montenegro 600
33. Luxembourg 500
34. Malta 400
35. Iceland 300
36. Liechtenstein 37
Per a Special Eurobarometer 243 / Wave 64.3 (2006) report on the language skills of
European citizens and their attitudes towards other European languages, German not
surprisingly is the most widely spoken mother tongue in Europe (18%) followed by

34
35

See discussion on Postscript
Figures rounded to the nearest thousandth
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English and Italian with shares of 13% each. 12% of Europeans speak French as a mother
tongue, and so on. Since this basic statistical measure represents or is an accurate
indication of the overall population size of the countries concerned, we expect this
country-to-sociolinguistic data correlation to remain a constant feature in Europe for the
foreseeable future relatively. That is, the same proportions shall be more or less speaking
these

languages

as

native

tongues.

Statistically,

therefore,

this

national

population-to-language correlation favors the large countries such as Germany with 18%
of Europeans claiming it as native tongue because of its population size (81 million
speakers). That is, more than half of the EU citizens (18+13+13+12 = 56%) speak one of
these four languages as mother tongues while only 44% speak the other remaining
languages as their mother tongues.
This is consistent with the conclusion that, other than the institutional support
languages receive that extends their reach, a country’s population size or national
demography remains one of the primary sources of language vitality (McConnell, 1997:
354) which is another way of saying that in Europe, “Apart from English, the rank order
of languages more or less follows the rank order of inhabitants.”36
One of the features of this correlation is that since the populous countries are also
some of the most prosperous and advanced economies in the Union, people in these
countries can be less inclined or compelled to learn the languages of those in the less
developed, less prosperous, and less populated countries who are more likely to have
greater incentives for learning the languages of the populous/prosperous countries. This

36

Eurobarometer Report Number 55, 2001:82
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is, since the freedom to work, travel, and study in another Member State - causal factors
for the new linguistic situation - is one of the compelling arguments for integration by
many EU citizens who are from less developed and prosperous economies. This also
suggests that, in the future, as many more Europeans move into the more affluent
countries and learn how to speak their languages, more people will therefore speak the
dominant languages of these countries - at least as second or foreign languages, perhaps
with the exception of Spanish, which is showing an increased demand from people living
in the four leading countries for reasons associated with its significance and standing in
Latin America37, for example. Moreover, since those in the more developed and
prosperous countries have little need to learn and acquire new language skills of the
languages of the lesser economies, then they will also be more likely to know fewer
languages such as the Germans and the French or may even remain monolingual speakers
especially for native English speakers whose language is being learned more and more by
other Europeans. This, however, has already been seen both an asset as well as a liability
for the mostly monolingual British with their mostly English-only language skills.
According to a British Council study conclusion, “It is a widely held – if not undisputed
– view that the UK is lacking in the necessary language skills for the future, partly
because of the status of English as the language of international communications.”38 This
observation is consistent with the remarks made earlier that the big and more prosperous

37

This is a case of an exogenous cause having an effect within the EU: how Spanish does in the
US and Latin America affects its relative position among other EU languages in EU. In the next
chapter, we will see how English does globally equally affects its relative positions against the other
EU languages in Europe
38
http://www.britishcouncil.org/sites/britishcouncil.uk2/files/languages-for-the-future.pdf
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countries tend to have less incentive for acquiring knowledge of languages from the small
and less prosperous ones.
Thus, in 200139 , in addition to their mother tongue, the languages most well-known by
Europeans are predictably as follows: English (41%), French (19%), German 10%),
Spanish (7%), and Italian (3%).
The remaining languages had scores of less than three percent each. This means that
80% of EU citizens (41+19+10+7+3=80%) now know at least one of these five
languages. More significantly, it means one needs only English (41%) and French (19%)
to be understood by at least 60% of all Europeans. And other than these five languages,
the rest of the other EU languages are spoken, for all practical purposes, only by those
who claim them as their mother tongues, which is another way of stating that they are not
that much spoken by others either as second or foreign languages outside of their home
countries.
In fact, according to a Eurobarometer 2001 survey (Report Number 55) on knowledge
of languages in the EU: “Forty-seven percent of EU citizens speak a language other than
their mother tongue well enough to take part in a conversation. However, there are large
variations between the Member States, with people in Luxembourg most likely to speak a
‘foreign’ language (97%) and people in the UK (27%) least likely to do so.” Again, this
outcome is highly consistent with what has already been noted here that people in smaller
states are more likely to learn other European languages while those of big states with
influential languages are less likely to do the same. In fact, the contrast can’t be more

39

Eurobarometer

2001 survey (Report Number 55) ?
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revealing since not only is the UK home of native English speakers, but Luxembourg is
also one of the smallest states and the home to not just its own national language,
Luxembourgish, but the two other important European languages: French and German.
Needless to say, the ability or inability to speak more than one language is neither good
nor bad in itself; however, it can be either a liability or an asset, for those able to speak
more languages can be more likely to take advantage of more opportunities in
multilingual societies such as Europe.
Thus, in estimating the languages most known to Europeans other than mother tongue,
the five languages - English, French, German, Spanish, and Italian are the most known
respectively. This argues that while the absolute strength of these languages isn’t
dependent on the integration process, their evolving relative worth within the European
Union is. Below we investigate what this relative rank within the EU reflects.
(II) Ranking the languages on a scale of deemed useful to know
Following the European Commission’s survey and analysis service, we can assess
and interpret any sociolinguistic changes based on languages Europeans deem most
useful to know.
In 2006 when asked which two languages, apart from your mother tongue, do you
think children should learn as citizens of the EU? The results were predictable:
77% of the EU citizens consider that children should learn English as their first
foreign language while the rest of the respondents were divided among the
remaining other major languages: French, German, Spanish, Russian, Italian and
Swedish in that order. English is number one in all countries polled, except the
United Kingdom, Ireland, and Luxembourg. French follows next with a 33%
share and German receives support from 28% of the respondents.40
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs_243_sum_en.pdf (“EUROPEANS AND
THEIR LANGUAGES”: 2006)
40
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That is, English (77%), French (33%), German (28%), Spanish (19%), Russian (3%),
Italian (2%), and Swedish (0%). Below is the full table showing the relative rank of the
seven major languages people deem the most useful to speak, apart from their mother
tongue in each country.
Table 5: Language preferences for children within the EU
Apart from your mother tongue, which two languages do you
think children should learn?
English
Swedish (%)
EU25 77%
BE
88%
CZ
89%
DK
94%
DE
89%
EE
94%
EL
96%
ES
85%
FR
91%
IE
3%
IT
84%
CY
98%
LV
94%
LT
93%
LU
59%
HU
85%
MT
90%
NL
90%
AT
84%
PL
90%
PT
90%
SI
96%
SK
87%
FI
85%
SE
99%
UK
5%
BG
87%
HR
82%
RO
64%
TR
72%

French

33%
50%
9%
13%
45%
6%
34%
44%
2%
64%
34%
49%
6%
6%
83%
4%
24%
22%
29%
7%
60%
6%
7%
10%
17%
71%
13%
5%
34%
12%

German

28%
7%
66%
62%
3%
22%
50%
14%
24%
42%
17%
19%
28%
34%
43%
73%
13%
40%
2%
69%
8%
69%
75%
24%
35%
34%
49%
69%
17%
52%

Spanish

19%
9%
4%
13%
16%
1%
3%
4%
45%
35%
17%
2%
1%
2%
2%
3%
2%
21%
10%
1%
7%
3%
3%
3%
31%
39%
5%
2%
7%
1%

3%
0%
9%
0%
6%
47%
0%
0%
0%
1%
0%
4%
42%
43%
0%
2%
0%
4%
10%
0%
6%
10%
1%
1%
14%
0%
2%
2%

Russian

Italian

2%
0%
1%
0%
0%
0%
2%
0%
1%
6%
1%
6%
4%
0%
0%
4%
0%
0%
0%
0%
0%
1%
2%
61%
0%
11%
1%
0%
2%
0%
1%
0%
0%
38%
0%
1%
3%
1%
14% 8%
1%
-
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Source:41
This data confirms that, for most Europeans of all countries and regions, English is
the clear choice for the language deem most useful to know, followed by either French or
German depending on the particular countries or region. It means that a new linguistic
situation, at present a tri-lingual one, has or is evolving in Europe in which most
Europeans who speak languages other than English, French, and German as their mother
tongues are now acquiring them as their regional language or English as the all-regions
lingua franca. This is the immediate future of Europe and its likely distant future as
well unless some major unseen linguistic situations emerge that disrupt42 the present
trend. It is the new linguistic situation for Europe replacing the old one that rose when
the nation states were created.
(III) Comparing changes in the demand for second and foreign languages over a
period
Using data from the European Commission’s Eurobarometer and Eurostat, this
subsection highlights the extent to which a clear trend has or is emerging, statistically.
Below we reproduced the EU’s official language membership list in chronological order,
first.
Table 6: Official EU languages since...
Dutch, French,
German, Italian

1958

Danish, English

1973

Greek

1981

Portuguese, Spanish

1986

http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs_243_sum_en.pdf
It would be interesting to see the future of English in the EU institutions if and when the UK leaves
the EU and it looses it official status; see postscript for more on that.
41
42
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Finnish, Swedish

1995

Czech, Estonian,
Hungarian, Latvian,
Lithuanian, Maltese,
Polish, Slovak,
Slovenian

2004

Bulgarian, Irish,
Romanian
Croatian

2007
2013

Source43
That is, the original official EU languages in 1958 were Dutch, French, German, and
Italian; English and the rest of the other languages did not join the official list until 1973.
The surveys by the EU Commission have shown the extent to which European feelings
and attitudes toward the EU institutions and their languages have changed over time as
the integration process unfolds. Since European economic and political integration is the
causal variable generating changes within the sociolinguistic sphere, the results have
followed an expected pattern: as the integration process goes, so has that been reflected in
the linguistic situation. For example:
In 198744 , within what was the EC12, the national languages spoken at home were:
Danish, Dutch, English, French, German, Greek, Italian, Portuguese, Spanish. Then one
out of three citizens of the European Community spoke at least one foreign language
‘well enough to follow a conversation’. Of those interviewed, 51% had at least some
training in English, 42% in French, 33% in German; while to speak ‘well enough to
follow a conversation,’ 36% spoke English, 27% French, and 25% German.

43
44

 http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/translation/translating/officiallanguages/index_en.htm
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb28/eb28_en.pdf
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Fast forward, in 200145, in addition to their mother tongue, the language most known
by Europeans is English (41%), followed by French (19%), German 10%), Spanish (7%),
and Italian (3%). In 2001, the languages widely considered as the most useful to know
apart from the mother tongue were: English 69%, French 37%, German 23%, and
Spanish at 19%. Only 5% of the EU population believed other languages would be most
useful to know.
In 200646 , ‘83% of EU25 respondents said knowing other languages is advantageous
while 50% of Europeans agree with the view that everyone in the EU should be able to
speak two languages in addition to their mother tongue.’
In 201247 , when asked to name the two languages, apart from their mother tongue, that
they believed to be most instrumental for their personal development and for children to
learn for their future, most Europeans think English is the most useful language at 67%,
German at 17%, French 16%, Spanish 14%, and Italian at 5%. Chinese at 6% and
Russia’s 4% were also mentioned as among other non-EU languages good to know for
personal development.48 No other language is specified as being of significant use by
more than 1% of respondents.
According to a 2015 Press Release by Eurostat (164/2015)49, “In 2013, 17.7 million
primary school pupils (or 81.7% of all the pupils at this level) in the European Union

http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb55/eb55_en.pdf)
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs_243_sum_en.pdf
47
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs_386_en.pdf


45
46



48

Mandarin Chinese is perceived to gain status with the rise of China while Russian was the lingua
franca within the Soviet Union and most parts of Eastern Europe
49

http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/2995521/7008563/3-24092015-AP-EN.pdf/bf8be07c-ff9d-40
6b-88f9-f98f5199fe5a
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(EU) were studying at least one foreign language, including 1 million (4.6%) studying
two foreign languages or more. At primary level, English was by far the most popular
language, studied by 16.7 million pupils.” As per the same Eurostat, “The second most
commonly studied foreign language at both primary and lower secondary level and upper
secondary level was French (19 per cent of pupils in primary and lower secondary level
and 23 per cent in upper secondary), followed by German (nine per cent, and 21 per cent,
respectively) and Spanish (six per cent and 18 per cent, respectively).” The evidence has
shown that, over time, more and more Europeans are learning another language, and that
English has emerged as their clear first foreign or second language of choice. And these
reordering of the languages by merit of usefulness by and large shows a clear
development toward a well-defined language hierarchy consistent with the theoretical
postulations discussed in section I and the predicted outcome outlined in section II.
3.5 Brief comment and conclusion
In this section, I examined the linguistic situation in Europe from past to present in a
transformational context showing how the Nation States system and national language
policies helped create a hierarchy of languages in every country and how national
languages such as English, French, German, and Russian emerged as more dominant
regional languages in Europe mainly as a result of their countries sizes. This is because
empirical researchers using the same or similar data typically measure such changes
without assessing their link to the causal variables that generate the changes over time. In
analyzing the economic and political integration as the dynamically causal variable
(process) in Section II and the ongoing changes in the linguistic situation as the effect or
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reactive variable in this Section III, we have therefore shown the cause-to-effect link
between the two phenomena. That is, within this framework, changes in the linguistic
sphere are explained by the integration process that determines the basic course of the
EU.
The next section looks further at the changes in the linguistic situation by examining
the evolving functions and status of English in Europe mainly in a tri-lingual setting.
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PART TWO: Sections IV
Effect of economic integration and political centralization on the functions and
status of the English language in Europe
In 1958, the then European Economic Community
passed a Regulation naming Dutch, French, German
and Italian as its official languages, these being the
languages of the first six countries to join the
organization. (EU Commission)
When dominant languages feel they are being
dominated, something much bigger than a simplistic
conception of power relations must be involved.
Crystal (1997)
In several Asian and African countries, English now
has national and international functions that are
both distinct and complementary. Kachru (1990)
In Section II, I examined the evolution and structure of European integration showing the
interactions of its principal spheres and how the functional spillover mechanism, in
particular, maintained the process and brought about integration from one sector, sphere,
or economy to another. I also examined how the formal and informal processes of the
process function and how different roles and functions are allocated between the EU,
Member States, and other agents through the subsidiary mechanism. Section III examined
the cumulative impact of the processes on linguistic diversity more generally which has
posed some interesting questions and policy challenges for policymakers on the European
integration. The section also explained how the current EI process, which seeks the
removal of political borders which act as linguistic barriers, for instance, has generated a
reverse sociolinguistic situation as a consequence where languages are coming into
contact in what is increasingly becoming a shared sociolinguistic space for language
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complementarity and competition. Thus, as demonstrated in the previous sections a
significant measure of sociolinguistic disturbance and linguistic transformation, triggered
mainly by the processes of integration, is taking place in Europe. That is, the evolution of
a new linguistic situation with the formation of a pecking order of language hierarchy led
by the emergence of a new Continent-wide English variety with the distinctive
characteristics of

the overall

sociolinguistic situation and broader European

macro-cultural context50 . As recent surveys indicate, “The five most widely spoken
foreign languages remain English (38%), French (12%), German (11%), Spanish (7%)
and Russian (5%).”51
Evidently, there are various sub-sociolinguistic situations evolving in Europe that are
also of interest in their own right: situations within individual speakers, country, region,
and within the institutions of the European Union. However, here I mainly look at the
reason or reasons that are propelling English as the top EU working and integrative
language. And as English keeps on increasing its share of being the most use language
within the EU institutions as well as the most commonly spoken second and foreign
language by most Europeans at the expense of the others, most notably French and
German, several studies have sought to explain the forces or factors behind its rise and
current position as now the de facto European lingua franca. Many observers of English
including Kachru (1992) have noted that this is not the first time the language is involved
in “historically and linguistically interesting and complex” situations where it competes

50

A European English variety comparable to the British, American, or Australian English varieties
because of its distinctiveness from them
51
2012
European
Commission
Press
Release:
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-12-679_en.htm
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and complements other languages (p. 53). In fact, for Crystal (1997), “There is the closest
of links between language dominance and economic, technological, and cultural power,
too, and this relationship will become increasingly clear as the history of English is told”
(p. 7). This section looks at the brief history, the role played by economic, political and
other factors in the development, spread, and dominance of the English language globally
as well as its present function and status within the European Union.
4.1. A brief historical overview of the development of the English language
Linguists generally (and conveniently) classify English as belonging to the Germanic
branch of the Indo-European language family - a family now considered the largest and
most widely spread and diffused group estimated to have about three billion or 46%
speakers worldwide 52 (Ethnologue, 2014). As I have noted in section III, in many ways
English is mainly a West Germanic53 language that is also historically and strongly
related to the Latin and Greek languages.
The Roman Empire, at its height of power in the second century C.E, extended to
Britain in the far fringes of Western Europe. The language of the Empire, Latin, became
the language of government, power, and prestige throughout its provinces including
Britain. As the Roman Empire began to disintegrate by the fifth century A.D and Latin
split into its four well-known modern languages (Italian, French, Spanish, and
52

Nations of Indo-European speakers: ‘Afghanistan, Albania, Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan,
Bangladesh, Belarus, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, China, Croatia,
Czech Republic, Denmark, Fiji, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, India, Iran, Iraq,
Ireland, Isle of Man, Israel, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Macedonia, Maldives, Myanmar,
Nepal, Netherlands, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russian
Federation, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Suriname, Sweden,
Switzerland, Tajikistan, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States, Vatican State, Venezuela’
53

See Section III for detail explanation of the German origin of basic English words.
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Portuguese), large groups of Germanic and Scandinavian speaking peoples began to
descend on Britain, bringing with them the Anglo-Saxon languages and culture (the order
of events can also be reversed according to which it was the coming of the Anglo-Saxon
peoples into the Roman Provinces which caused or accelerated Roman disintegration54).
In any case, as they become the dominant economic and political power in Britain their
languages, West Saxon in particular, also mixed with and came to dominate the ‘native’
Celtic (or the autochthonous) languages and Latin which gave the ancient English its first
mix of lexicon and grammatical structures which at times frustrate researchers interested
in its etymological and often irregular features55.
Furthermore, the Norman Conquest of what is now "England" in 1066 C.E. moreover
further changed the evolution and structure of the language; for about three centuries
‘Old French’, a language similar to Latin, became the new language of the law,
administration, and the courts in Britain. During this period, Old English mixed with this
language too and evolved into Middle English which left French, and through it even
more Latin words, with significant influence especially on the lexical inventory of the
language as demonstrated in the previous section. The evolution and development into

54

“Meanwhile Roman power on the Continent came under irresistible pressure from barbarian
invaders. The Goths crossed the Danube and in 378 annihilated a Roman army and killed the
Emperor Valens. In 406 an enormous horde of Germans swarmed across the Rhine and descended
on France. They could not be driven out but were with difficulty ejected into Spain and North Africa.
The city of Rome itself was sacked by the Goths in 410. The Empire in the West fell to pieces. The
British were left to fend for themselves.” (Richard Cavendish, p6)
55
For instance, “The England of the Megalithic period felt the impact of a strong Negroid
Egyptian-Phoenician influence. In fact, the first Phoenician and Sidonian navigations of the Bronze
Age are contemporaneous with the XVIIIth Egyptian Dynasty…; the Phoenicians, subjects and
brokers of the Egyptians, fetched tin from the Sorlinguan Islands, meaning from England… It was in
this period that a pre-Christian African vocabulary came into what was to become the English
language: ancient Saxon.” Diop (1991:19)
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Modern English have since been shaped by a wide range of other comparable events or
influences: European Renaissance and the resurgent interest in the Greco-Roman
traditions, development of modern science and technology using Greco-Latin roots in
English, British global colonial expansion, the founding of the United States, and so on.
In each case, the English language underwent substantial change and enrichment with
more lexicon from such linguistically diverse places as Africa, North America, and Asia
as evidenced by a wide variety of modern loan words in the language.56 Its expanded
vocabulary as well as the high number of words it has for expressing related ideas, which
all have contributed in making it a rich and attractive language of choice, is due to these
historic contact and language exchanges. Together, these profound developments account
for the fact that at present over 75 percent of all English words and the vocabulary of the
modern sciences and technology have Latin or Greek roots, according to Crystal (2003).
A great deal more could be said about the chronological development of the English
language including a further detail history to account for the various layers of lexical and
grammatical elements that entered it at different periods in its history - as we have
demonstrated in section III. However, the fact that it is also possible to show a strong link
between the economic and political factors (the interactive co-independent variables) and
the spread and development of the language (the dependent variable) has led some
analysts to argue that there is a positive link between the two phenomena (for instance,

56

The English word ‘coffee’, for instance, is from the Fulani word ‘kade’ for ‘bitter beans’ via the
Asian form ‘kave’ or ‘kafe’ - a linguistic fact which can be inferred from the fact that coffee is a
Sudanic/Ethiopian native bean; ‘banana’ is also a West African word probably from the Mande
language; the words ‘guru’ for a teacher and ‘totem’ for kin group (a concept of great value for
anthropologists) are from the East Indian and Native American languages respectively; just as the
word ‘ginseng’ for the name of a plant, is of Asian origin.
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see Kachru (1990), Phillipson (1992), Crystal (2003), Graddol (1997, 2006)).
4.2 The economic and political factors and the global spread of English
Many comparisons have been made between the conditions and processes that gave
rise to past lingua francas such as old Egyptian (Fulani), Chinese (Mandarin), Arabic,
Latin, and French and the present situations of Spanish in Latin America, Swahili in East
Africa, and that of English both globally and in Europe. In each case, analysts have
argued that languages prestige, its functions, status, and spread are causally linked to the
technological, economic and cultural power of its speakers, In their view it was
inevitable, with England and later the United States leading world industrial capitalism
and the information age in the last two centuries, that English would correspondingly
become the dominant global language. Moreover, with the establishment of British- and
US-led global institutions such as the United Nations, World Bank, IMF, and many
others, it was also argued that the global standing and role of English would be
maintained and further enhanced.
But how exactly are the two phenomena - economic and political power and the rise
of the language correlated?
4.3 The ‘grassroots theory’ and the ‘exploitative theory.’
There are two basic approaches usually employed in the literature to explain the
relationship between economic and political factors and language dominance: "the
grassroots theory" and "the exploitative theory" (Mair 2002). The latter refers to a
situation in which a dominant language in contact with lesser prestigious languages exerts
strong constraining pressure on their range and function such that the contact tragically
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results in what linguists are increasingly referring to as either ‘language murder’ or
‘language suicide.’ In varying degrees, the dominant language spreads over, assimilates,
or replaces the lesser prestigious ones in a manner that gradually leads to either ‘linguistic
obsolescence’ or the ‘loss of domains.’ Dominant languages such as Spanish in Latin
America that spread in this way at the expense of others are known as ‘killer languages.’
The latter, the grassroots theory, refers to a rather limited and more voluntary use of a
dominant language typically among speakers of mutually different languages as a
common, available, and neutral language such as in Singapore where Malay, Tamil.
Mandarin and English coexist with English functioning as the common language. Given
this, the exploitative model arguably does not quite fit neatly describe the current spread
of English within Europe. That is, the 'grassroots' theory which emphasizes a utilitarian
function for the rise of the language, therefore, must be included. I explained this by the
link between the enhanced global position of English outside of the EU by both the
exploitative and the grassroots models and its current status within Europe by the
grassroots model. That is, English does well in Europe as it rises globally.
Kachru57 has made a useful contribution in this connection by incorporating
extra-linguistic, sociopolitical and demographic variables to explain the influence and
role of English in native and non-native countries or settings. His model consists of three
concentric circles: inner, outer, and expanding in which each circle consists of a set of
countries where the language performs different functions and has different statuses: as a
mother tongue, an official language, and a foreign or international language, respectively.
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Cited by Crystal In English as a Global Language (2003: 60-61).
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That is, the inner circle represents countries where English functions as a mother tongue
such as the UK or the US. In the outer circle, for historical reasons, it plays a significant
part in the country's’ administrative and educational institutions and functions as an
official language such Nigeria and India. In the expanding circle, however, it is widely
and mostly used as a lingua franca or ‘connecting’ foreign language – that is, in those
countries where the language has played no administrative or historical role such as
China and Russia. The relationship between the circles is described as 'norm-providing'
(inner), norm-developing' (outer) and 'norm-dependent' (expanding). This relationship,
however, is soon to be reversed, at least, according to Graddol (2000:5): “The main areas
of development in the use and form of English will undoubtedly come from non-native
speakers.” That is, the innovation will originate from the outer and expanding circles or
countries to the inner one.
4.4 The different functions and roles of English in different countries
The figure illustrates the role of English in each circle according to Kachru:

Figure 1. The different roles of English

82

In this subsection, I shall, therefore, apply this model to show the functions of the
language within each circle and why it is increasingly becoming the primary integrative
language as well as the first choice for most Europeans.
Kachru (1992:58) identifies four key functions the English language performs in
different local, national, and global contexts which according to him have made it highly
competitive and the natural choice in a growing number of countries including Europe:
1. instrumentality – English as a medium of learning in educational systems;
2. regulative – English in administrative and legal systems;
3. imaginative – English in various literary genres, and
4. interpersonal – English as a link language between speakers of different
languages or dialects in socio-linguistically pluralistic societies and as a language
of elitism and modernization.
That is, English performs various combinations of these functions in different countries
for different persons depending on the local situation: as mother tongue, a national
language, an official language, and a foreign or international language.
Since many EU national languages are also highly developed languages and perform
many of these functions in their respective countries, therefore it is mainly the
‘interpersonal’ (and international) functions use among a growing majority of EU citizens
as well as the rest of the world that account for the continuing rise in the demand for
English in Europe. In fact, Ammon (2015) has blamed the low standing in the global
market of languages on poor German language policies.
More recent studies have indicated that English is also gradually playing an important
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role as a medium of learning in the educational systems in much of the European Union58
in spite of these function having been traditionally performed by national languages. This
increasing role for English is consistent with the emerging linguistic situation and EU
language policies that encourage EU citizens and require EU students to learn and to
become proficient in at least one or two EU languages other than their mother tongues59
one of which is almost always English. Thus, the spread of English in Europe can be
considered as the result of many factors that enable it to meet and advance the
communicative needs of an integrating Europe than can similarly be accomplished by
other languages given their functional reaches in Europe and globally.
In some countries or even regions, German can perform many of these functions quite
well, while in other nations, it is French that performs them well. The Russian language,
for historical reasons already noted, is also used for some functions in some regions,
especially in the former Soviet Republics and Eastern Europe. None of these languages,
however, increasingly performs all functions at all levels - at the intrapersonal, local,
national, regional, European, and international as effectively as English does for
Europeans. For instance, if a Danish wants to speak or do business with someone in
Greece, a German doing business with a Gambian, a Polish talking to a Singaporean
business representative, a Swedish vacationing in Italy, a random EU officials interacting
at a Cafe at the European Parliament, in any of these interlocutions, the chances are that
English would the language use in the majority of cases.
And since languages that cannot or do not perform these functions satisfactorily would
58

Various European Commission Studies and Surveys have shown that English is becoming more
and more the medium of learning
59
defined as the language first learned and still spoken by an individual
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be relatively disadvantaged and thus less in demand, therefore, this is the key to
understanding why English is becoming so successful within Europe. In fact, such a
linguistic situation where speakers of different languages are motivated or compelled to
adopt English as their common and convenient language is not a new phenomenon.
The linguistic and cultural pluralism in Africa and South Asia contributed to the
spread of English, and helped foster its retention even after the colonial period
ended. The nationalist awakening needed a pan-national medium for a resurgence;
the medium chosen was, ironically, the “alien” language. And there were reasons,
both cultural and linguistic, for that choice (Kachru, 1990:7-8).
Crystal (2003) has summed up the global context that gave rise to the position of the
English language today this way: “The present-day world status of English is primarily
the result of two factors: the expansion of British colonial power, which peaked towards
the end of the nineteenth century, and the emergence of the United States as the leading
economic power of the twentieth century” (p. 59). Graddol (1997) and Crystal (2003)
have also identified the following major areas where English is already universally
recognized as the global language as the direct result of the two factors Crystall (2003)
discussed:
● the language of world trade, and banking
● the working language of international conferences and organizations
● the language of international law
● the language of international travel safety: aviation and maritime
● the language of global brands advertisements
● the language of international tourism
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● the language of physics, chemistry, biology, medicine, technology transfer,
academic (scientific) publications60
● the language of the media/press, public broadcasting, the internet, and cultural
audio-visual products such as popular music, film, and TV
● the language of higher or university education, literature, and
● increasingly, the ‘relay language’ in translation and interpretation within the EU
institutions
These are some of the universally recognized key functional areas that give the English
language the decided advantage over its competitors. And it is also the interplay of these
functions, together with ‘the prestige factor’ on English as the language of progress as
well as the ‘neutral language factor,’ which makes the language the inevitable choice as
lingua franca for Europe. Harold Schiffman (1997) explains how the perception of
English as the preferred ‘neutral language’ between the speakers of different countries in
Europe has already helped raised its status as their lingua franca. "The use of the
H-variety German in Alemannic Switzerland conversely may be seen as a power-trip
designed to put the Swiss speaker at a disadvantage. The fact that the Hochdeutsch
speaker may have no alternative L to use may be irrelevant; it certainly explains the
desire to switch to ‘neutral’ English or French” (p. 214). That is, by opting for English, it
places everyone on an equal footing, except for native English speakers whose advantage
can be reduced only by the evolution of a real European English variety.
4.5 The principle of natural selection as it applies to language competition and
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‘Publish in English or perish’ means to be able to reach as many peer readers, within the
academic field, one has to publish in English...
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complementarity and the rise of English dominance
Given that French, along with English, is the co-official and working language of most
international bodies, the fact that it is the only other truly global language besides
English, given that German is also the language of the most populous and economically
dynamic European nation, and given that at present both French and German are
threatened by the growing demand and use for English throughout Europe itself - suggest
that the principle of Natural Selection, popularly known as ‘survival of the fittest’, may
also apply in situations of linguistic diversity within a common space. That is, under
natural selection, adaptive or “advantageous” feature tend to produce more successful
ones than their peers do, perhaps accounting for the luck of languages in situations of
linguistic diversity and political integration. Since a particularly interesting effect of the
European integration is its impact on linguistic diversity by ‘compelling’ or exposing
languages into greater contact not just to complement but also to compete one another
within the EU institutions and in Europe, the principle of natural selection, therefore,
seems the most natural, effective, and ‘invisible force’ or explanation that sorts out the
languages by placing each in its ‘right place’ or in a hierarchy of useful worth. As
Graddol (1997:36) explains, for instance, “The English language flows into other
languages, which adopt English words and phrases. English also ‘colonises’ the space of
other languages by taking over certain communicative domains.”
4.6 Survey of language usage in the EU
Below is a sample Eurostat report on the complementary and competing demand for
some languages within the EU educational institutions from 2005-2011 to demonstrate
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the dynamics that are playing out within the emerging new linguistic situation that creates
a ‘pecking order.’
On primary education
Within primary education a clear majority of pupils (choose to) study English.
Indeed, learning English is mandatory in several countries within secondary
education institutions, and so a number of EU Member States have close to 100 %
of pupils learning this language already in primary education... The highest shares
of primary education pupils studying English in 2011 were recorded in Malta,
Spain, Austria, Italy, Greece, Croatia and Poland, with more than nine out of
every ten children studying English; this was also the case in Liechtenstein,
Norway and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. The relative
importance of English as a foreign language may be further magnified because
pupils tend to receive more instruction in their first foreign language than they do
for any subsequent languages they (choose to) study.
Many of the central and eastern European Member States that joined the EU in
2004 and 2007 were characterised by the fact that learning Russian was
compulsory in the past. This situation has changed rapidly and these days most
pupils have more choice concerning the language(s) they wish to study. In most of
these countries there has been a marked increase in the proportion of pupils
learning English, often above 50 % of all students, and in Bulgaria and Lithuania
over 70 % in 2011, with the peak over 90 % in Poland (as already noted above).
Luxembourg is also of particular interest, insofar as there are three official
languages, with most pupils receiving instruction in Luxembourgish, German and
French at primary level; English is only introduced at secondary school. A similar
situation is observed in Belgium, with the focus in primary schools on learning
French or Dutch (depending on the community and/or region), rather than
English.
Apart from Luxembourg, the only other EU Member State where more than one
quarter of primary school children learnt French as a foreign language was in the
United Kingdom, where this share exceeded two thirds (69.6 %). German is the
main foreign language taught to all primary school children in Luxembourg, while
more than one fifth of primary children were taught German in 2011 in Greece,
Croatia and Hungary.
On secondary education
Turning to language learning in upper secondary school... some 93.8 % of all
EU-28 students at ISCED61 level 3 were studying English as a foreign language in
ISCED: International standard classification of education ‘is an instrument for compiling
internationally comparable education statistics. The ISCED 97 version covers two classification
variables: levels and fields of education as well as general/vocational/prevocational orientation and
61
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2011, compared with slightly less than one quarter (23.0 %) studying French and
slightly more than one fifth (21.1 %) studying German. Between 2006 and 2011,
the proportion of students at ISCED level 3 in the EU-27 studying English
increased slightly (up 0.7 percentage points), while the proportions studying
French and German fell 7.7 and 13.8 percentage points respectively.
Luxembourg and the Czech Republic stood out as the countries with the highest
proportion (100 %) of secondary education students (at ISCED level 3) learning
two or more languages in 2011, while there were also shares above 90 % recorded
in Finland, Slovenia, Slovakia, Romania, Estonia (2008 data), Sweden and
France; note this indicator includes all foreign languages, not just German,
English and French.
Source: Eurostat 2015: ‘Foreign language learning statistics’
And since the average foreign language learned by each student is about two, and
since the first foreign language of choice is English, and since no other EU language
constantly follows second place to English in every country, therefore, this means that the
other major languages: namely, French, German, Italian, Spanish, and Russian are second
foreign language choices only in their respective regions of influence. Meaning, they are
simply regional languages and are not as spread as English has become. As noted by
Kachru (1992) for languages under similar situations,
The spread of one language in relation to others is a phenomenon which
presumably goes far back in human history as the existence of a multiplicity of
languages. Certainly, it is documented as far back as written records go; e.g., in
the second millennium B.C., Akkadian replaced Sumerian but the speech
community retained the latter in certain learned uses. Also, it is a familiar
phenomenon for one language to serve as a lingua franca or language of special
functions (religious, commercial) over a large area of many languages: Sanskrit,
Greek, Latin, Arabic, and French are examples at various periods and in different
parts of the world. But there has never before been a single language which
spread for such purposes over most of the world, as English has done in this
century. (p. xv)

educational/labour market destination. ISCED 97 was implemented in the European Union (EU) for
collecting data starting with the 1997/98 school year.’
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And since the language that is the dominant choice for today’s young generation
becomes the language of the future, and given the present trend, therefore, it is
predictable that English would be the language of the future for Europe.
4.7 The growing use of English and the relative decline of others in Europe
I now examine the rise of English and its relationship with the national languages in
Europe. Obviously, since both French and German are two highly developed, well
protected and prestigious national, regional and international languages on their own
rights, and since from a purely linguistic perspective no language is inherently superior to
another and are identical on all levels of abstraction (a Chomskyan conception),
‘something much bigger than a simplistic conception of power relations must be
involved’, to repeat after Crystal (1997). The replacement of the Russian language in
Eastern Europe for English, the relative and steady decline in the use of two major
European languages, French and German, within the very Pan-European institutions they
co-founded62 has raised understandably some interesting questions and concerns.
The table below illustrates the rise of English and the relative decline of French and
German in written use within the European Union institutions over a 14-year period.
Table 6: ‘Languages of primary texts produced by the European Commission (in %)’

1986
1989
1991
1996
1997
1998

French

English

58
49
48
38.5
40.4
37

26
30
35
44.7
45.3
48

German
11
9
6
5.1
5.4
5

Other
5
12
11
11.7
8.9
10

“In 1958, legislation specified German, French, Italian and Dutch as the official and working
languages of the European Union’s (EU) predecessor, the European Communities”.
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90

1999

35

52

5

8

(source: Truchot, 2002)
In this table, the increasing use of the English language over time is closely correlated
with the declining use of both French and German, the two main international languages
at a competition with English. That is, the evidence shows some systematic correlation
between the progress of economic integration and political centralization and the
emergence of a linguistic hierarchy. It indicates that economic and political integration
involving countries with different languages can have significant linguistic consequences.
In other words, despite EI being initially a Franco-German project, and despite the fact
that the first official language policy of the then European Community (EC) identified
French, German, Italian, and Dutch only as the working and official languages of the EC
(EU), English is now the dominant integrative language. The fact that English has been
diminishing their functions in the EU institutions and European society in general imply
that some of the consequences of integration are fundamental and unintended. In fact,
this has been happening in spite of deliberate efforts aimed at slowing down the pace and
changing the trend - perhaps, teaching us one or two things on the behavior of culture
change discussed in Section I.
In an article written by Amelia Gentleman (2004), ‘French-language fightback as
English colonizes EU,’ she reported that despite efforts to reduce the impact of the
increased use of English, France is achieving the opposite results:
The creation of the school in Avignon reflects mounting anxiety in Paris that the
EU - originally a primarily French body, with its main headquarters in
Francophone countries, formed along the lines of French administrative
structures, with French as its core language - is drifting further from its roots with
every expansion. Between 1997 and 2002, the use of French in European council
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documents, for example, dropped 24% while there was a 32% rise in English. A
survey of officials from the new member states this year showed that almost 70%
had English as their second language.
A trend that is expected to rise as more young people learn English than they do in other
languages in schools as already noted which is also consistent with a Eurobarometer
Special Surveys conducted in 200163 which found, among other things, that:
The foreign language to be spoken by most young Europeans is, without surprise,
English. One young person out of two (whose mother tongue is not English)
declares having a sufficient knowledge of the language to take part in a
conversation. This is more or less the same percentage as in 1997 (54 %) but
noticeable more than in 1990 (42 %) and in 1987 (34 %). In other words, English
is steadily becoming the young Europeans lingua franca.
And as if to make matters more challenging for the French and German languages, the
Survey also notes that “As in 1997, Spanish is the foreign language young people (29%)
would prefer to learn.” That is, it is Spanish which is surprisingly becoming the second,
second language preferred by young Europeans besides English. Therefore, it is safe to
state or even predict that English is being selected for and shall be the lingua franca
within the European Union. In part, this is because, as Kachru (1990:98) noted, “the
planning for the spread of English is steadily passing into the hands of its non-native
users” and is therefore nearly unstoppable or irreversible unless some extraordinary
opposing event like a total disintegration of the EU took place. Girod (2011) puts the
effect already felt by some languages as the result of a correlation:
It's been indisputable for some time that English is becoming the ‘universal
language.’ As the number of living languages has steadily decreased, the use of
English has expanded on every continent. And though English has not — despite
predictions — crushed all other languages (German, Russian, and Spanish, to cite
the prime examples, all remain strong), one language does seem to be undergoing
the predicted cataclysmic collapse. English may not yet have won the globe, but
63

YOUNG EUROPEANS IN 2001 Results of a European opinion poll:
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs_151_summ_en.pdf
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French has definitely lost it. 64
All this demonstrates that the power or influence of a language involves more than a
complex interplay of hegemonic factors derived from the economic, political, and
cultural power matrix of its speakers. It shows sociolinguistic factors such as the range of
functions a language has, all have made English the best suited for a common language in
Europe. This also demonstrates that the coercive or language imposition thesis often
applied to explain the spread of English outside of Europe cannot fully account for the
language’s relative success in Europe where it actually faces other successful, European,
international, and former imperial languages such as French, German, Spanish, Italian,
and Russian and on their home countries.
Therefore, while rejecting the linguistic imperialism theory of Phillipson (1992)
directly for the success of English in Europe, I argue that it's phenomenal spread there is
due, in large measure, to two major factors: 1/ its global success that compels most
Europeans to communicate with non-Europeans in English, and 2/ its use or
appropriation as the ‘neutral’, common denominator language - the most common reason
for a lingua franca, as noted earlier. In other words, we accept Crystal’s argument that
English now plays the most crucial and needed role in international communication.
4.8 The future linguistic situation in Europe and the future of English
The paper sought to demonstrate that there is a link between the process of economic
and political integration and changes on the linguistic situation in Europe as shown by the
evolution of a new linguistic hierarchy and by the growing use of English the common
64

The French government has also been fighting back: in 1994, through its Toubon Law, the
government mandated the use of the French language in official government publications.
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language in Europe. The sociolinguistic evidence presented made a strong case that the
harmonizing and homogenizing dynamics of the economic, political, and social
integration in Europe have a significant impact on linguistic diversity. The evidence has
shown that the new linguistic situation and the spread of English in Europe are the
consequence of the dynamic, expansive EI process.
Consequently, when modeling the continent’s evolving sociolinguistic trajectory, the
most predictable in time according to the analyses presented in this paper will be the
gradual evolution of a linguistic pecking order, accompanied by an increasing language
convergence whereby languages become more similar to each other, and the emergence
of a new continent-wide English variety with the distinctive characteristics of the broader
macro-cultural context and overall sociolinguistic situation of Europe. That is, according
to a model of transition from speaker innovation to linguistic change (James and Lesley
Milroy, 1997:51). In the future, English will be, therefore, the most used language for
intra-EU-wide communications in which it performs the different roles and functions as a
mother tongue to some, a second language for many, and a lingua franca for most. Below
is a joke that has aptly captured a model summary of how the new European English
variety most likely would evolve:
The European Commission has just announced an agreement whereby English
will be the official language of the EU rather than German which was the other
possibility.
As part of the negotiations, Her Majesty's Government conceded that English
spelling had some room for improvement and has accepted a five year phase-in
plan that would be known as "Euro-English".
In the first year, "s" will replace the soft "c". Sertainly, this will make the sivil
servants jump with joy. The hard "c" will be dropped in favour of the "k". This
should klear up konfusion and keyboards kan have 1 less letter.
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There will be growing publik enthusiasm in the sekond year, when the
troublesome "ph" will be replaced with "f". This will make words like "fotograf"
20% shorter.
In the 3rd year, publik akseptanse of the new spelling kan be ekspekted to reach
the stage where more komplikated changes are possible. Governments will
enkorage the removal of double letters, which have always ben a deterent to
akurate speling. Also, al wil agre that the horible mes of the silent "e"s in the
language is disgraseful, and they should go away.
By the fourth year, peopl wil be reseptiv to steps such as replasing "th" with "z"
and "w" with "v". During ze fifz year, ze unesesary "o" kan be dropd from vords
kontaining "ou" and similar changes vud of kors be aplid to ozer kombinations of
leters.
After zis fifz yer, ve vil hav a reli sensibl riten styl. Zer vil be no mor trubl or
difikultis and evrivun vil find it ezi to understand ech ozer. Ze drem vil finali kum
tru! And zen world! 65
This is in fact not a joke anymore but an evolved reality that the European Union form
of English is differing from other recognized varieties of English, including its use of
“words that do not exist or are relatively unknown to native English speakers outside the
EU institutions66 .” For instance, in EU English, the word “‘action’ is used countably as a
synonym for ‘scheme,’ ‘project’ or ‘measure,’ the latter are preferable.”67 And the
purported German influence in the emerging English variety in Europe can be explained
by the fact that Germany remains the most important European country both regarding
the size of its population of native speakers as well as the size and influence of its
economic output.
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http://www.ahajokes.com/eng011.html
 ttp://www.nytimes.com/live/eu-referendum/britain-english-language/#
h
(see:http://ec.europa.eu/translation/english/guidelines/documents/misused_english_terminology_eu
_publications_en.pdf)
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http://ec.europa.eu/translation/english/guidelines/documents/misused_english_terminology_eu_publ
ications_en.pdf
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This section IV and section III have therefore shown that there is indeed a causal link
between the process of European integration and the ongoing overall changes within the
sociolinguistic situation in Europe. The next section concludes the paper with some
summary discussion on current events such the eurozone crisis, Brexit, the Greek crisis,
and suggestions on a therefore minimalist model of political strategy on language policy.

V. Conclusion:
Speakers give up their language gradually and
knowingly (and even to a degree voluntarily) as its
functions are taken over by a more powerful rival.
This typically occurs after an extended period of
bilingualism, during which there is a reduction of
the social functions and in consequence the
grammatical and lexical complexity, of the dying
language. Herbert Schendl (2001)
If the sociology of language is preoccupied with
language presence/usage in terms of social
functions and roles, as well as the environmental
forces of change that influence these roles, then it
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may be argued that some sort of program of control
or planning should be applied to influence the
course of events. Grant D. McConnell (1997)
The EU’s founding treaty states that EU citizens
have the right to communicate with the EU
institutions in the official language of their choice,
and to receive a reply in the same language. ~
European Commission
5.1 Summary of the present study
The aim of the thesis has been: to examine the effect of economic integration and
political unity on linguistic diversity and the new function and status of the English
language in Europe. The paper has offered an overview of the state of European
integration and has concluded that there is a dynamic, causal link between the process of
economic and political integration and the evolving linguistic situation in Europe as
shown by these significant developments:
● growing complementarity in language choice and use,
● increasing competition in language choice and use,
● the gradual evolution of a linguistic hierarchy, and
● the emergence of English as a common language
From the start I realized, in making a descriptive and analytic assessment on such a topic
within a vast field in such a short thesis, it was necessary to be more selective in what I
wished to describe, analyze, and explain. However, in order to avoid viewing European
integration in too narrow and shallow a fashion, I chose to consider the question in a
rather broader, richer, and macro context by drawing on anthropological insights as well
as from the economic and political science approaches on the structure and behavior of
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political and socio-cultural systems.
I have therefore incorporated different methods and ideas in the presentation than is
commonly attempted in a similar paper which has allowed me to situate, analyze, and
interpret the current, evolving linguistic situation in Europe in a transformational context
showing that it is both triggered by and entirely consistent with the overall economic and
political integration process. Section I introduced some of the literature’s pertinent
insights and approaches on the study of the behavior of dynamic systems more generally
while Section II reviewed the evolution and structure of the EU process and system in
particular from the 1950s to the present as typically discussed in more recent studies
showing the interactive links between the economic and political spheres that determine
the system's underlying behavior. And, Sections III and IV analyzed the reactive
sociolinguistic field especially concerning the emerging linguistic hierarchy as well as the
growing role being played by English as the leading integrative and shared language in
Europe respectively. The evidence shows that, on the whole, the economic and political
variable forces of change that influence the process have a significant impact as
languages complement and compete with one another in various formal and informal
contexts within an evolving pecking order in accordance with the principles of
equilibrium, economy, and subsidiarity. The paper found the development of this
linguistic hierarchy and with it the movement toward a de facto lingua franca to be a
fundamental effect or aspect of the overall process as it provides the necessary
sociolinguistic adjustment.
As the evidence in the three-sphere - the economic-political-sociolinguistics -
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macro-analytic framework has shown, the parallel and dependent process of change
within the sociolinguistic sphere, also governed by the dynamics of harmony, economy,
and subsidiarity is a necessary consequence of the economic and political integration
process. The evidence does not indicate the causality runs in the reverse: changes within
the linguistic situation is the effect. A common language can facilitate but does not
necessarily lead to economic integration or political union; the Arabic language in the
Middle East, or Spanish in South America, for example, have not fostered closer
integration among member states sharing them in common. On the other hand, economic
and political integration, beyond a certain level, leads to cultural integration as well that
increases the demand for and the emergence of a common language; Recently, the
Russian language within the ex-Soviet Union, and now English in the European Union,
for instance. The analysis has confirmed that economic and political integration within
linguistically diverse and highly open societies causally leads to linguistic integration as
well and thus the process of integration can indeed predict the future linguistic situation:
the more closely integrated Europe become, the more well-defined would be the
emergent hierarchy of languages in terms of which languages are utilized for what
functions. That is, developments in the sociolinguistic area are systematically related and
consistent with the economic and political integration process and thus can serve as a
leading indicator for the overall process. A total disintegration of the integration like the
Soviet Union, for instance, or a partial slowing of the process such as signaled by ‘Brexit’
(the abbreviation for Britain's (UK) exit from the EU can also affect the direction of the
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process of a sociolinguistic situation or regime. As a recent survey (2013)68 about the
effect of economic crisis on culture within the EU indicates, “A comparison with the
2007 survey shows that, across the EU, there has been a decline in participation in the
majority of activities asked about, which may reflect an overall reduction in the amount
of money or time EU citizens spend on cultural activities since the economic crisis
began.”
5.2 Globalization, the dynamics of integration, and crisis
In sections I and II, globalization and its far-reaching effects 69 were viewed as a
distant exogenous variable on the movement toward regionalism generally and toward
European integration in particular. It was also noted in Section II that, as a result of the
vast opportunities and constraints presented by globalization, few European countries had
either the desire or the capacity to go it alone in what sometimes seems a hostile global
environment where great cultural and political powers like Russia, China, the US and
some powerful multinational entities are major players. Hence, among other things, the
need and call for European integration. As examined in Section II, the ‘periodic’ crises
within the EU whether it be political, economic, or institutional have almost always being
addressed by commitments for further integration whose rationale or argument, I have
explained, is that solving current problems or challenges also require addressing
structurally related areas that are yet to be integrated into the overall process.70 I
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http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs_399_sum_en.pdf
‘What does globalization have to do with the erosion of welfare states? Sorting out the issues’
ARENA Working Paper 17/1996, Andrew Martin.
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“Hollande, Merkel press for clear agenda for post-Brexit
EU”:http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2016-09/16/c_135689948_2.htm
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discussed the ‘spillover thesis’ as the mechanism of problem-solving that brings about
further integration. It argues that in effect, European integration has been a slow process
of progress often mired with periodic crises and that until it reached to a certain level of
comprehensive political, economic, industrial, monetary, financial, fiscal, legal, labor,
cultural, etc. integration, major disruptive crises were still bound to occur - again and
again just as the current eurozone crisis affecting Greece, Italy, Portugal, Ireland, etc. and
the ones before that. In fact, the ‘spillover thesis’ predicts such crises since the dynamics
between areas not yet integrated (and there are still many) and the ones that are
integrated, are some of the primary sources for such crisis or tension. That is because it is
through such tensions or crises that policy makers are compelled to act and that it is by
addressing the current crises such as the debt crisis that (formerly) unintegrated areas
such as fiscal policy become integrated.
5.3 Roots of Brexit and the Greek debt crisis - and the call for more reform
European integration of the kind envisioned by its architects requires compromise
between national sovereignty of Member States and more EU. And except for European
countries that are not part of the EU, the UK has been the most reluctant to engage in the
trade-offs considered necessary between sovereignty for a cohesive, stronger EU. This
explains why even before its formal decision to leave the EU on June 23, 2016, the UK
was not in the Eurozone monetary union, not a member of the Schengen passport-free
movement agreement, and was not in favor of building a joint European defense, among
others. In other words, the UK has always been a one-foot-in, one-foot-out Member State
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in the EU; its only notable achievement for any EU-wide project has been the promotion
of the English language in Europe - which is now the most widely spoken second
language in the EU71. Its decision for leaving the EU is hence mainly for political reasons
- which is, to remain unbound from EU rules and regulations for which there are
incentives but also costs72 . For instance, Theresa May, the British Prime Minister, “said
she wanted to ‘operate’ within the EU's single market, yet end free movement of people
and the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice”, whereas President Hollande, the
French President, has said that “There must be a threat, there must be a risk, there must
be a price. Otherwise, we will be in a negotiation that cannot end well.” 73
Brexit’s most likely effect on the EU is a further and deeper integration for the rest of
the EU in areas not yet integrated such as a collective defense74, a single foreign minister,
the extension of the Schengen borders outward, common fiscal policy, etc. As noted in
the postscript, Brexit would have little to no adverse effect on the role and status of the
English language in Europe whose propagation is already now in the hands of its

“Teaching English. Testing proficiency. Supporting learning”: https://www.britishcouncil.org/english
“Jean-Claude Juncker, the European Commission president, suggests UK will not have access to
single market after Brexit”:
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/09/13/eu-facing-an-existential-threat-in-the-wake-of-brexit-jea
n-claud/
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non-native speakers.
As for the Greek crisis, like the Portuguese and Italian ones, however, it is a different
kind of crisis from that of the UK which is mostly a political act that is beyond the mere
concerns of human migration and social costs. The Greek crisis is mainly an economic,
debt crisis which is the result, among some domestic factors, of structural imbalances
within the EU-wide integration structure which advantaged economically stronger
members at the expense of the relatively weaker ones. Greece became Europe’s most
acute debt crisis center for reasons also related to the contagious linkages of the global
economic implosion in 2008. In their recent studies, Daianu, D'Adda, Basevi, and Kumar
(2014), described the root of the crisis as “a flawed design and inadequate policy
arrangements, which have invited rising imbalances among EU member states.”75 That is,
the eurozone crisis is merely an acute form of ‘structural, trading imbalances’ of capital
and labor markets that are also the result of the uneven dynamics within the EU-global
political economy.
In short, beyond the normal weaknesses of some of the southern economies, thus what
became Greek pains and Spain’s losses turned out as gains for the German economy76,
for instance. Eriksen put it this way: “The EU’s member states, and in particular the
Eurozone members, have moved themselves into a community of fate through lock-ins
and normative commitments. Mending the Eurozone crisis has become a matter of
justice, as some are profiting and some losing on the European Monetary Union.

http://councilforeuropeanstudies.org/critcom/the-eurozone-crisis-and-the-future-of-europe/
Germany government gained from Greek crisis - IWH study:
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-33845836
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However, there is disagreement as to what medicine is the right cure.”77 And the
interactions between the Greek financial institutions, the European Central Bank, and the
IMF to resolve the crisis have only managed to postpone a resolution since the
interventions merely act as an effort of shifting potential losses from private international
creditors to ones of public European governments. Thus, the austerity measures for the
Greek economy were no more than efforts aimed at squeezing national resources and
funds as much as is practically possible for private and public debt servicing as is
typically done in third world countries. The “joint European Union-IMF €110 billion
financing package to help the country ride out its debt crisis, revive growth, and
modernize the economy”78 as noted by the IMF has been understood as effectively
meaning a joint EU-IMF financial support to help pay off private international creditors.
And as noted in Section II, the history of European integration indicates that further
integration that incorporates the financial, the fiscal, and other not yet integrated areas is
the next logical and likely step; neither a return to national currencies nor restrictive
measures to protect domestic markets can be the practical solution. As Kathleen R.
McNamara, Associate Professor of Government & International Affairs, Georgetown
University (2010), puts it, “The history of the EU shows that crisis often—but not
always—leads to increased integration.”79 That is, according to the way the EU has been
constructed thus far, it will be more integration - not less integration - since the alternate
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solutions would be far more costly and therefore less likely options. This is because not
only are the national economies interdependent but also the unintegrated areas are all
dynamically related with the ones already integrated and the ‘spillover thesis’ strongly
suggests the integration of these yet unintegrated areas in the future. This is how the
European Commission head, Jean-Claude Juncker, said it recently on Sept. 14, 2016:
“The European Union still does not have enough union. There are splits out there and
often fragmentation where we need further union, that is leaving space for galloping
populism.”80
5.4 International political and economic crisis and the refugee problem in Europe
The very causes of the refugee crisis globally and in Europe particularly has its roots
in the geopolitical dynamics of political conflicts and economic downturns and hence is
beyond the aim of this paper to directly address exhaustively. Thus, only a cursory
overview of the effect of the refugee crisis on the dynamics of the integration process and
its impact on the sociolinguistic situation in Europe is discussed. Hence, a few things can
be said on the refugee influx in Europe, its causes, and some of the ways to address it.
First, the refugee’s problem is not just a European crisis; it is a global one. Second, the
European refugee crisis is mainly the result of Sub-Saharan Africa, North African, and
Middle Eastern refugees influx driven by conflicts in which the major European powers
such as the UK, France, Germany, and Italy are participatory actors. Third, the refugees
are thus all both economic as well as political refugees. Fourth, Europe itself, refugees or
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no refugees, is in a deep political and economic crisis of its own as noted and the refugees
simply exacerbate the problem. The European Commission81, citing the UNHCR as its
source, puts the global refugee crisis in perspective.
The world is facing an unprecedented displacement crisis. Today, more than 65
million people are forcibly displaced as a result of violent conflicts and natural
disasters.
In 2015, over 1 million people – refugees, displaced persons, and other migrants –
have made their way to the EU, either escaping conflict in their country and in
search of better economic prospects. While the numbers have shown a decreasing
trend in 2016, by June around 156 000 people have reached Europe.
And with this, it can only be added that, in the short term, each EU country will
experience a different refugees impact either because of proximity to the migration
source such as Italy and Greece are or owing to the attraction of a national economy such
as Germany is. However, in the long-term, the most likely step to address this crisis or
future such crises would be a collective response that shifts either partial or the whole
control of national borders from Member States to an EU-wide external borders control
mechanism that would be a further integration.
As for the refugees’ impact on the sociolinguistic situation, no major effects or
changes to the already outlined trajectory is expected since most of the refugees have
English as their international language of communication. That is, if anything, the
refugees will more likely help elevate the already growing status of the English language
in Europe as explained in sections III and IV. For instance, even though immigrant
refugee children upon arrival in Germany receive German language training, one cannot
fail to notice that the foreign language skills they display is not German as shown by the
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English vocabulary of a young Syrian refugee, Muhammad: “‘Melon, bananas, and
cherries!’” (Sumi Somaskanda, 2015)82
Since the aim of the thesis has been to examine the effect of economic integration and
political unity on linguistic diversity and the new function and status of the English
language in Europe, I will now conclude with a summary discussion and suggestion of a
therefore minimalist model of political strategy on language policy.
5.5 Summary discussion on relations between the EU’s integration strategies,
linguistic diversity, and the language policy challenges
In order to show causal relations to better help suggest a more practical approach to
language policy options, the organization of the paper and its sections have been
intentionally structured around:
●

the nature of the behavior of socio-cultural systems,

● the structure and development of European integration,
● the history and evolution of the contemporary linguistic situations of Europe,
● and the reactions to the effects on language choices and use,
with the aim of gaining valuable insights on the process in order to meaningfully help
address some of the concerns on the present linguistic situation particularly concerning
the developing issues and policy considerations on a practical language regime for the
EU. In my view, it would be a mistake to design and set in motion a language policy for
Europe that is in opposition to the core efforts being made on a more comprehensive
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economic, political, and social integration -

since language and other cultural

differences, when promoted to a certain level, can and do become obstacles to economic
efficiency, political unity as well as other negative social conditions.
The idea that countries should proceed to protect and promote their respective
languages and cultural identities while simultaneously seeking an ‘ever closer’ economic,
political, and social union can be regarded as a fundamental contradiction since
promotions of differences and diversities within an integrating, open, and common space
to some degree can and do undermine cohesive unity that is being sought through a
people's Union. And since this tension between the commitment to diversity on one hand
and the need and call for integration on the other and the necessity to reconcile the two
has been a source of active policy considerations and frustrations within the EU project,
this paper addresses, therefore, two basic and broad strategies that can be considered,
each with its own costs and merits: a managed multilingual regime vs. a self-generated
language hierarchy.
5.5. A managed multilingual regime vs a self-generated language hierarchy.
First, the EU can either choose to intervene through a combination of strategies and
policies based on some protections and incentives on behalf of languages viewed or
recognized as in need of special assistance. “For instance, the Saami languages of
northern Finland, Sweden, Norway and the Kola Peninsula (Russia) have only a few
hundred speakers in some communities and are in danger of dying out.”83 Second, or it
can choose to let languages compete and complement one another, in accordance with the
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Darwinian model, based on the principle of demand and supply in which free market
forces determine the use and luck of each language.
The first strategy, the choice to intervene through a combination of language policies
based on special guarantees so that all EU citizens can communicate and receive official
information through their languages, has the merit of maintaining the essential link
between the citizens and their EU institutions. Furthermore, the use of all languages in
official communications while costly and may be administratively inefficient makes the
EU not only apparently transparent but a more inclusive and legitimate institution in the
eyes of the citizens. The downside of this first strategy is that policymakers would have
to bear its associated costs as well as forego the merits of the second strategy.
The second approach, letting free market forces determine the fortune of each
language, entails possible and practical consequences that could be considered as both
politically ‘unacceptable’ and socially ‘undesirable’ including the decreasing use of some
languages with the resultant losses of certain domains of language use for others, among
others. For other languages, exclusion from official use not only would affect those who
use them but it also may threaten the languages’ very long term status, vitality, and even
survival since their speakers would be increasingly drawn to adopt the languages chosen
for official communication. Moreover, excluding languages from official communication
not only contradicts the EU language policy and law84 as it is, it could also prevent some
speakers from communicating in the languages of their choice with the effect that they
would be either unable or unwilling to fully participate in the political process as active

‘The Treaty of Rome and Regulation 1/1958 stipulates that all EU languages are to be treated on an equal
basis with respect to publication of official EU documents and that EU citizens have the right to
communicate with EU institutions in an EU language of their choice.’
84
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citizens. Furthermore, limiting the official or working languages to just a few or one
would be not only a violation of the EU language laws, but it would also serve to
adversely restrict access to information resources for those whose languages have been
excluded as well as alienate those who personally and culturally identify with them.
However, its upside, letting the market decide, means official communication would
be streamlined, financially less costly, more efficient, and less complicated. That is, given
that the EU institutions and corporate businesses spend much time and resources on
communication through the multiplicity of languages as required by law85, the free
market strategy would provide not only greater efficiency but also financial savings on all
language-related matters. Moreover, it would minimize the technical complications that
often result from constant translation, interpretation, and storage of published materials.
And it is also through the efficient market mechanism - that is, the Darwinian model that an ‘optimal number’ of working languages in the EU, whether it is just one, two, or
three, etc. can be possible, produced, and maintained.
These conflicting considerations for “a managed multilingual regime” versus “a
self-generated language hierarchy” situations have been highlighted simply in order to
acknowledge the difficulty and complexity on some of the key sociopolitical issues at
hand and how to formulate a sociolinguistically neutral, efficient policy strategy with
minimal costs.
These are, therefore, the two practical options available to the EU language policy

‘ Article 217. The rules governing the languages of the institutions of the Community shall, without
prejudice to the provisions contained in the rules of procedure of the Court of Justice, be determined by the
Council, acting unanimously.’
85
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planners. And as noted, there are both the benefits of plurality requiring the maintenance
of diversity and benefits around integration requiring the promotion of unity and
homogeneity. The two, diversity and unity, while not mutually exclusive forces and are
of benefit together within limits, when pressed beyond a certain degree in opposite
directions, however, could pose an inherent risk of fundamentally undermining each
other and their system. As Clyne (1997) has noted, the optimal option in multilingual
societies is a delicate balance that takes into account the social, political, economic, and
sociolinguistic needs:
Language policies… and or community attitudes may enforce, support, accept,
tolerate, or reject multilingualism or give special status to one or more than one
language. Where language policies have been formulated to promote
multilingualism, the motivation may be: Social - in the interest of equity for all
groups; Cultural - to facilitate cultural maintenance; Political - to ensure the
participation of all groups and / or gain their electoral support; Economic - to be
able to harness language assets to the advantage of the country’s balance of
payments.” Singapore, for instance, has three major ethnic groups - Chinese,
Indians, and Malays but it has four official languages Mandarin, Tamil, Malay
respectively and English which serves as the language of interethnic and
international communication. (p. 303)
5.6 Integration, linguistic diversity and suggestion for a therefore minimalist model
of political strategy on language policy
As noted above, it is argued for good reasons that introducing any limited set of
languages or a single language regime in the EU challenges the rights to information
access and language use for many people and it poses the problem of which languages or
language to choose for some: whether it should be English which is already the language
most widely understood and used in the EU, German which has the most native speakers
in the EU, French which was the most widely used for EU-level internal communications
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purposes though now in sharp decline, or some other. Thus, admittedly, choosing any set
of languages or language has the potential to stir protest because of the fact that language
issues remain inherently sensitive and divisive; and some people would be strongly
against the promotion of any language unless it is one’s own that is chosen. And since
there are 24 86 EU official languages at present the choice could get even more
complicated and less practical than the case with Singapore where only four languages
are involved, for instance.
However, since the vast majority of EU official documents already get prepared first
in English before translation into others, it seems reasonable that Europe should promote
national language policies that align with such practical, evolving communications needs
of the EU institutions if it is to remain integrated and united similar to the existing
‘controlled full multilingualism’ which requires that a European Parliament document
that is drafted in any language need not necessarily be translated directly into all other
languages automatically but only to the most widely used relay languages first: English,
French or German. This practical approach increases efficiency, streamlines work,
reduces workload while allowing an adaptive language policy serving all EU citizens to
emerge efficiently, naturally, and minimally.
And the all-inclusive language policy while a popular and should remain a key
objective, the current official multilingual regime of language equality before the law
need be only in principle through a transitory phase during which the evolving language

‘Bulgarian, Croatian, Czech, Danish, Dutch, Estonian, English, Finnish, French, German, Greek,
Hungarian, Italian, Irish, Latvian, Lithuanian, Maltese, Polish, Portuguese, Romanian, Slovak, Slovenian,
Spanish and Swedish.’
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hierarchy whose nature and merits is discussed above is allowed to ‘naturally’ adapt
itself. As Crystal (2003) noted, such a policy of language hierarchy is, in fact, essential
for multilingual existence and maintenance.
Arguments about the need for national or cultural identity are often seen as being
opposed to those about the need for mutual intelligibility. But this is misleading.
It is perfectly possible to develop a situation in which intelligibility and identity
happily co-exist. The situation is the familiar one of bilingualism - but a
bilingualism where one of the languages within a speaker is the global language,
providing access to the world community, and the other is a well-resourced
regional language, providing access to a local community. The two functions can
be seen as complementary, responding to different needs. And it is because the
functions are so different that a world of linguistic diversity can in principle
continue to exist in a world united by a common language. (p. 22)
5.7 The any-three-language set option model for any European
This paper, therefore, suggests a three-language hierarchy optimal combinations for
every EU speaker analogous to Kachru’s concentric circles on the uses of English as a
global language. I have adapted his idea to formulate a linguistic situation of any
three-language set option for any European as shown in Figure 2.
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Figure 2. Any three-language model for any European
That is, for each person, the inner circle (A) represents ‘national languages’ (nl) one of
which is spoken as mother tongue, the outer circle (B) for the ‘regional languages’ (rl)
one of which is spoken as national language, and the expanding circle (C) for the ‘EU’s
common language(s)’ (cl) spoken as the language(s) understood by most people. In this
way, knowing at least one language in each circle enables anyone to understand and be
understood by everyone in Europe. Thus, one need to speak only one or at the most three
languages for successful communication with others in Europe. A Belgian who speaks
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Dutch as mother tongue, French or German as regional language and English as the
common European language (CEL) would, for example, be able to communicate with
other Europeans who also speak any three European languages within their concentric
circles such as someone in Spain who speaks Catalan as mother tongue, Spanish as the
regional language and English as the common language - where their common language
is English. As shown in Sections III and IV, English is already the de facto common
language as illustrated by Fenyo (2003) in figure 3 following Berns (1995) who adapted
Kachru’s model of world Englishes for Europe.

Figure 3. The concentric circles of European Englishes
In brief, I suggest two strategies on language policies for a minimalist model of
political strategy on language policy: 1/ Transitional Policies and 2/ Adaptive Policies.
The transitory policies are temporary measures and may permit or even require a limited
intervention of sorts for some languages for some time while the later are long-term,
process-adaptive policies to allow the linguistic situation to continuously adjust itself to
the overall condition of the integration process as it unfolds. Since language issues or
conflicts are mostly indications of ‘other’ broader and deeper economic, political,
historical, or cultural issues or grievances in society, this paper also recommends robust
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policy measures that address the perception or reality of these other non-language,
negative considerations such as discrimination, prejudice, and alienation of people.
5.8 Conclusion
Finally, in carrying out this research on the evolution of the European Union, I have
tested some key theories of social science. Through the three-sphere macro-analytic
framework I have developed here, I have found the relationships between the economic,
political, and sociolinguistic areas to be dynamic and causal with correlated development
and different speeds in the same direction. Though the paper did not deal in depth with
the many detailed aspects of language behavior, the recommendations put forward for
policy strategies are, however, based on the nature of the co-relationships between the
political, economic, and sociolinguistic variables that are highly consistent with the
general systems behavior and systemic change, technology-led change, economic
primacy, spillover mechanism, and the Darwinian model - which I have set forth in
Section I and referenced throughout the paper.
And while this thesis isn’t claiming to have uncovered new insights during the
theories validating process, I have nevertheless gained a better understanding of the
relevant links between the economic, political, and sociolinguistic aspects as
conceptualized in the three-spheres model analyses framework allowing me to accept the
conclusions arrived at with good confidence. I therefore encourage further studies of
similar approach to improve and formalize the concept of a therefore minimalist model of
political strategy on language policy developed here for Europe in order to formulate
more effective, efficient, and better strategies on linguistic diversity in political unity.
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A POSTSCRIPT
‘In 1958, the then European Economic Community
passed a Regulation naming Dutch, French, German
and Italian as its official languages, these being the
languages of the first six countries to join the
organization. (EU Commission)’
‘The regulation listing official languages of the EU
would have to be changed unanimously by
remaining countries if they want to keep English as
an official language’
‘The Commission has already started using French
and German more often in its external
communications, as a symbolic move after Britain
voted to leave the EU’
The future of English in the EU after Brexit?
It was observed in sections III and IV, particularly since the EU expanded into
Scandinavia and Eastern Europe, that English has been slowly and steadily increasing its
influence while edging out both French and German to become the most dominant
language of the EU even to the dismay and protest of others, notably, the French87 . So,
will English remain the EU’s de facto official language now that the UK is leaving the
EU? In other words, could ‘Brexit’ actually threaten the dominant status of the English
language especially within the EU institutions? The answer is No, Not Really, and Except
- depending on how things unfold.
First, since English is already the most commonly understood foreign language in the
EU, the one learned by most young Europeans as a second language, and the most widely
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Considering the fact that the EU institutions were located in predominantly Franco-German
speaking cities of Brussels, Luxembourg, and Strasbourg.
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spoken language in the world, it is most likely to retain its current status and influence in
the EU regardless of happened next. So, considered from this overall reality, the answer
is no, Brexit would not threaten the dominant status of the language in the EU.
Second, if at least one country identifying English as its official language chooses to
remain in the EU, this would help maintain unaffected the language’s current official
status and political legitimacy. So, viewed from this possibility, the answer is not really,
Brexit would not threaten the official position of the language in the EU.
And third, now that the UK will activate Article 50 of dissociation, English will likely
not be one of the block’s official languages since it was Britain alone in the EU which
had identified it as an EU official language (Ireland having declared Gaelic as its EU
official language). It could lose its official status as soon as Britain leaves the EU especially if there is no EU-wide desire and political will to keep the language and its de
facto current state. In fact, there is the possibility that the French and the Germans whose
languages were the most affected by the rise of English dominance would instead seek a
more assertive approach in promoting their languages - either or both as a gradual
replacement to English. But since any change to the EU’s language policy to drop
English from the current regime would itself require a unanimous vote from all Council
of Ministers whose most common language is English, the EU could simply decide to
leave it as a working language with or without official status but take measures that limits
its influence in the organization in accordance with the Franco-German wishes. So,
considered from an EU without the UK, the answer is English is likely to remain
functional except if the Council wants an EU without English. English is, in fact, the
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language of the European Central Bank even though the UK remained out of the
Schengen visa-free travel area or the eurozone - and is likely to play the same role in the
Eu even without UK membership.
P188. The real problems of replacing English in the EU
Since the UK’s vote leave the EU, the debate over the future place of the English
language in Europe has intensified with some suggesting that the EU would have no
English as an official language in its future.
However, there are two major problems to encounter in any effort aimed at
diminishing, edging out, or replacing English with either French or German in the EU.
First, as David Crystal and others have noted, the English language remains the most
useful global language of our time because of its unmatched international roles and
functions. It is the only language which enjoys a privileged position in the multilingual
society of the 21st century, appearing in the language mix in every part of the world
including the EU, according to Graddol (1997:63). To try to eject it out of the EU
language mix would, therefore, require complicated steps and political decisions.
Secondly, as Kachru (1990:98) and others have also pointed out, the planning for the
spread of the language has already passed into the hands of its non-native users even in
the EU, and therefore, any efforts to try to reverse, hamper, or remove it out of the
language mix in the EU would require extraordinary difficulties at this stage. As we have
noted in Sections III and IV, the education systems of most EU Member States are, in
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fact, so highly geared toward teaching English as the first foreign language that even
Brexit is less likely to change the position of the language in the EU.
P2.The future of English and why the EU may have no other options
David Graddol, commissioned by the British Council in 1997, published ‘The Future
of English?’ to forecast future use and learning of the English language worldwide and
the potential benefits for UK native speakers. Using the language’s legacy of history,
current status, and global trends, he concluded that “no single language will occupy the
monopolistic position in the 21st century which English has - almost - achieved by the
end of the 20th century” (p. 59). Below is an index score he used showing the ranking of
‘global influence’ of the 12 major languages according to an Engco model analysis that
incorporates, among other variables, the economic and cultural power of a language’s
native speakers.
1. English
2. German
3. French
4. Japanese
5. Spanish
6. Chinese
7. Arabic
8. Portuguese
9. Malay
10. Russian
11. Hindi/Urdu
12. Bengali

10089
42
33
32
31
22
8
5
4
3
0.4
0.09

Table 7
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‘An index score of 100 represents the position of English in 1995.’
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According to him, “Chinese, Hindi/Urdu, Spanish, and Arabic may join English” at the
top as most influential global languages while “French and the other OECD languages
(German, Japanese) are likely to decline in status” (1997: 59). In other words, “English
will remain pre-eminent for some time, but it will eventually become one language
amongst many” (1997:61). This finding is useful in that it helps us see why the EU is
likely to proceed with English in post-Brexit Europe because the language is so deeply
ingrained in the EU at this stage for any change to be feasible or desirable. In fact,
English already accounts for more than 80% of all new internally drafted legislative
proposals, according to some estimates.90 This is because, English’s two main EU
challenger languages, French and German, both face imminent retreat or decline in their
share of global influence in the future.
Also, though at present all EU citizens enjoy the right to freely live and work in other
EU countries without legal requirements to speak any country’s languages in order to do
so, and though UK citizens not only would have to apply for visas to travel within the EU
area but also may be required to meet any language policy requirements for living and
working in an EU country such as Germany or France, however, the fact that English
would continue being the lingua franca for most EU citizens means that the EU may have
no better option but to keep it in the EU language mix even after Brexit.
Obviously, with Brexit not just the sociolinguistic aspect but the whole integration is
being tested - but again, exactly, it is going to proceed as the theories predict it will MORE EU and not less. An EU country, under the treaties, accepts all the ‘Four
90
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of officials wanting access to other documents not in their own languages regardless of their
nationality
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Freedoms’: the freedom of movement of goods, services, capital, and people. No country
is exempted to pick and choose out of the four which ones it wants to opt out on and
which ones it wants to keep. Apparently, the UK wants to keep the first 3 freedoms of
movement of goods, services, and capital but not people. It wants the benefits that come
with the 3 freedoms but not the responsibility or cost that accompany the 4th freedom the movement of people91. That is going to be the complication in the negotiations on
Article 50 that might bring it back into EU AGAIN. It would not be surprising if the UK,
failing to get a "special" exit ideal package, re-applies to remain in the EU sooner than we
can see - giving English keep the political cover it needs.
Conclusion
Some basic facts about languages and the English language in Europe:
● The EU has 24 official and working languages of which French, German, and
English are the recognized working languages in its institutions’ executive arm not a surprising as they are also the languages of the block’s three largest
economies.
● The EU has fewer official languages than the Member States because some
members share common languages.
● English is one of the 24 EU official languages because of UK which identified it
as its official language which 13% of EU citizens speak as their native language.
It is spoken by ninety-eight percent of UK residents as a first language.
● English is one of or the official languages of Great Britain, the Republic of
Ireland, Northern Ireland, Scotland, Wales, Malta, Gibraltar, Jersey, Guernsey,
and the Isle of Man.
● French and German are each spoken by 14% while Spanish and Russian at 6%
each, and Italian at 3% of the European population.
● Scandinavian countries have the highest working knowledge of English.
● Keeping English post-Brexit could make communications in the EU fairer since
most of those speaking it would be using a foreign language.
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Ironically, it is the UK’s educational policy towards promoting its language that goes to explain
why it is the English-speaking countries of the UK and Ireland that are also the migrant destination
for Europeans able to function better in English than in other EU languages.
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● English could or will remain a working language in the EU though it may not
remain an official language.
● English is the world global lingua franca, the most commonly spoken foreign
language in 19 out of 25 EU countries - with nearly half of EU citizens who claim
to have sufficient conversational skills in it.
These facts constitute the factors generating some of the sociolinguistic dynamics
within the EU.
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Notes
The Notes is a short list of some basic ‘terms’ or ‘concepts’ used in this paper.
The evolutionary approach: the diachronic progression of societies from simple to
complex
Theories: ‘a coherent group of tested general propositions, commonly regarded as
correct, that can be used as principles of explanation and prediction for a class of
phenomena.’
Variables: they are events or things that can vary or change in value or characteristics in
ways that can be measured. A variable can independent, dependent, or precedent. The
measure of how much two or more variables change together is their ‘covariance’.
Politics - ‘the making of decisions by public means’ - Karl Deutsch
A political system: ‘a coordinated set of principles, laws, ideas, and procedures relating
to a particular form [or arrangement] of government.’
European integration: the process of the political, economic, sociocultural, and the legal
integration of states and peoples in Europe. Unless specified such as economic
integration or political integration that are restricted to integration within their spheres,
the term ‘integration’ refers to total process of European integration.
Dynamism: ‘the quality of being characterized by vigorous activity and progress’
Spillover effects: ‘they are the political, economic, and other events that occur in one
context because of something else in a seemingly unrelated context had occurred. They
are secondary effects that follow from a primary effect though may be removed in time or
place from the primary events themselves.’
Neofunctionalists: theorists who ‘maintained that the unintended consequences of
integration, once launched, would be self-reinforcing.’ ~ Andrew Moravcsik
Spheres / domains: as applied here, the two words are more or less interchangeable to
the mean, distinct areas of analysis, activity, or control. In the sociolinguistic sphere or
domain, the area also encompasses sub-domains as language acquisition, pragmatism,
multilingualism, contact linguistics, etc.
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Micro vs. macro analysis: micro analysts analyze the individual, the smallest units of
interaction within a system while macro analysts focus on the system itself or the ‘big
picture.’
Levels of analysis: are levels of abstraction or generalization that isolate a particular
level for analysis from its complex whole. In Europe, it may be individual, the Member
states, or the EU itself. In this paper, the EU is the level of analysis
Linguistic diversity: the existence of more than one language in a country, region,
Mutual intelligibility: the degree of mutual understanding that people may have based
on how close their languages are or perceived to be related or similar to one another such
as Norwegian and Danish or Spanish and Italian.
Multilingualism: ‘can refer to either the language use or the competence of an individual
or to the language situation in an entire nation or society.’ ~ Michael Clyne
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